TAX, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, AND NORMS
STEVEN A. BANK*
This paper examines the use of federal tax provisions to effect changes in state law corporate governance.
There is a growing academic controversy over these provisions, fueled in part by their popularity among
legislators as a method of addressing the recent spate of corporate scandals. In order to better understand
and distinguish between the possible uses of tax as a tool of corporate governance, this paper takes a
historical approach by focusing on two measures enacted during the New Deal – the undistributed profits
tax in 1936 and the overhaul of the tax-free reorganization provisions in 1934 – and considers why the
former was so much more controversial and less sustainable than the latter. While some of the difference
can be explained by the different political and economic circumstances surrounding each proposal, this
paper argues that the divergence in the degree of opposition can be explained in part by an examination of
the extent to which each provision threatened an underlying norm, or longstanding standard, of corporate
behavior. The paper goes on to test this norms-based explanation against several recent attempts to enact
corporate governance-oriented tax provisions and concludes that it has modern relevance. The
implication is that while Congress may use the Tax Code to reinforce existing norms of corporate
behavior, it is likely to be less successful when it tries to use the Code to change existing norms or
introduce new ones.

I. INTRODUCTION
President Bush's proposal to end double taxation, which was justified in part because it
would increase dividends and thereby improve corporate "accountability,"1 was only the latest
example of the federal government's effort to use the Internal Revenue Code as a tool to modify
corporate behavior. In recent years, Congress has enacted or introduced a number of corporate
governance-motivated tax provisions – from limiting deductions for allegedly excessive
executive compensation and imposing excise taxes on the receipt of so-called “greenmail”
payments during takeovers to denying deductions both for stock options that have been expensed
*
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U.S. Treasury, Eliminate the Double Taxation of Corporate Earnings, available at
http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/docs/bluebook.pdf (last visited February 2, 2004) ("[T]he proposal will enhance
corporate governance by eliminating the current bias against the payment of dividends. Dividends can provide
evidence of a corporation's underlying financial health and enable investors to evaluate more readily a corporation's
financial condition. This, in turn, increases the accountability of corporate management to its investors.").
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for accounting purposes and for punitive damage payments.2 In fact, almost since the inception
of the corporate income tax, Congress has recognized its potential to serve as a de facto system of
federal corporate law. Proponents of the earliest corporate income tax in 1894 predicted that one
of its benefits would be the “salutary” influence it would have on corporations by establishing a
means of federal oversight.3 When President Taft later proposed an excise tax on corporations in
1909, he noted that one of the merits of the tax was “the federal supervision which must be
exercised in order to make the law effective over the annual accounts and business transactions of
all corporations.”4 Federal taxation was a means to preempt the traditional state role in the
regulation of corporations without actually establishing a system of federal incorporation.5
Despite its long history, the attempt to regulate corporations through the tax system has
had only mixed results. In many cases, Congress' corporate governance-motivated tax reform
efforts have failed miserably. This is not to say that tax reform has failed to actually modify
corporate behavior for at least a brief time, although this may be the case in some instances.
Rather many of the tax provisions introduced or enacted as part of a corporate governance reform
effort have simply failed, in the words of Mark Roe, to "survive" in the face of fierce corporate

2
See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 162(m) (limiting the deductibility of non-performance based executive compensation to $1
million); 5881 (levying an excise tax on the receipt of “greenmail,” or above-market payments by target management to
a shareholder mounting a hostile takeover bid); 280G & 4999 (disallowing deductions of certain “golden parachute”
payments, or payments to departing target executives upon a change of control, and imposing an excise tax on their
receipt); Ending the Double Standard for Stock Options Act: S. 1940, 107th Cong. (2002) (bill introduced by Senators
Carl Levin (D-Mich.) and John McCain (R.-Ariz.) to only allow corporations to deduct nonqualified stock options to
the extent of the amount treated as expenses for purposes of reporting earnings); Jumpstart Our Business Strength
(JOBS) Act: S. 1637, 108th Cong. (2003) (bill introduced by Senators Charles Grassley (R.-Iowa) and Max Baucus (DMont.) to, among other things, end deductibility for punitive damages and to require CEO signatures on tax returns).
Treasury has not always been a willing partner in Congress' decision to use the Tax Code as a tool to influence
corporate governance. See Sheryl Stratton, Treasury: Fix Executive Comp Abuse But Lay Off the Tax Code, 99 TAX
NOTES 191 (2003) (reporting on comments made by Assistant Treasury Secretary for Tax Policy Pamela F. Olson in
opposition to efforts to use the Code to combat Enron executive's abuse of the compensation system).
The U.S. is not alone in its effort to use the tax system as a tool of corporate governance. During the post-World War
II-era, the U.K. has instituted no less than four major reforms of the corporate tax system that can be traced back to the
desire to influence corporate behavior. See MERVYN KING, PUBLIC POLICY AND THE CORPORATION 5 (1977); SVEN
STEINMO, TAXATION AND DEMOCRACY: SWEDISH, BRITISH, AND AMERICAN APPROACHES TO FINANCING THE MODERN
STATE 47-48 (1993).
3
William L. Wilson, The Income Tax on Corporations, 158 N. AM. L. REV. 7 (1894) (Wilson was the chairman of the
House Ways & Means Committee).
4
44 CONG. REC. 3344 (1909) (message from President Taft). See also Marjorie E. Kornhauser, Corporate Regulation
and the Origins of the Corporate Income Tax, 66 IND. L.J. 53 (1990).
5
This is not to suggest that federal incorporation itself has never been considered. Progressive-era reformers called for
an explicit federal incorporation requirement in the face of a perceived decline in state corporation laws, but such
proposals were defeated. See MARTIN J. SKLAR, THE CORPORATE RECONSTRUCTION OF AMERICAN CAPITALISM, 18901916 203-85 (1988); Theodore H. Davis, Jr., Comment, Corporate Privileges for the Public Benefit: The Progressive
Federal Incorporation Movement and the Modern Regulatory State, 77 VA. L. REV. 603, 622-23 (1991). In large part,
the securities laws enacted in 1933 and 1934 served as a de facto federal corporations law. See Robert B. Thompson &
Hilary A. Sale, Securities Fraud as Corporate Governance: Reflections upon Federalism, 56 VAND. L. REV. 859, 869
(2003).
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resistance.6 If they survived enactment and were not technically repealed within a few years, they
have been effectively rendered useless or counterproductive and their continued existence has
been the subject of much criticism.7
Notwithstanding such criticism, recent observers suggest that in some cases tax can be an
effective ally in the fight to reform corporate governance. David Schizer, for example, argued
that a variety of tax rules have served as an effective hindrance to executive hedging
transactions.8 Reuven Avi-Yonah goes further, arguing that the corporate tax, and, by implication
corporate rates, can be used "to control the excessive accumulation of power in the hands of
corporate management."9 This normative conclusion draws support from recent studies in the
economics literature that demonstrate the corporate governance benefits of strong tax
enforcement by reducing the level of "managerial diversion" of corporate assets.10 Given the
existing political support and academic controversy surrounding the use of tax as a tool of
corporate governance, the challenge is to more fully investigate whether some corporate
governance-motivated tax reforms may be better positioned to succeed than others.
Perhaps the best prism through which to understand the use of taxation to modify
corporate behavior is the experience of the New Deal. Not only does it have the advantage of
historical distance, but the New Deal is replete with examples of corporate governance-oriented
tax provisions. During a relatively brief period of time, Congress embarked on an ambitious, but
ultimately unsuccessful, campaign to change corporate behavior through tax reform.11 Thus,
between 1932 and 1936, legislators enacted or attempted to enact tax provisions designed to
restrict the growth of large corporations,12 to eliminate the holding company structure,13 to lower
6

See MARK J. ROE, STRONG MANAGERS, WEAK OWNERS: THE POLITICAL ROOTS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE FINANCE
118 (1994).
7
See, e.g., David I. Walker, Tax Incentives Will Not Close Stock Option Accounting Gap, TAX NOTES 851 (2002);
Susan J. Stabile, Is There a Role for Tax Law in Policing Executive Compensation, 72 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 81, 90-92
(1998); Kurt Hartmann, Comment, The Market for Corporate Confusion: Federal Attempts to Regulate the Market for
Corporate Control Through the Federal Tax Code, 6 DEPAUL BUS. L.J. 159, 199 (1993); James R. Repetti, Corporate
Governance and Stockholder Abdication: Missing Factors in Tax Policy Analysis, 67 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 971, 974
(1992); Eric A. Lustig, The Emerging Role of the Federal Tax Law in Regulating Hostile Corporate Takeover
Defenses: The New Section 5881 Excise Tax on Greenmail, 40 U. FLA. L. REV. 789, 792 (1988).
8
See David Schizer, Executives and Hedging: The Fragile Legal Foundation of Incentive Compatibility, 100 COLUM.
L. REV. 440, 446 (2000) (noting the corporate governance benefits of certain tax barriers to executive hedging
transactions).
9
Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Corporations, Society and the State: A Defense of the Corporate Tax 65 (unpublished
manuscript 2003).
10
See Mihir Desai et al., The Protecting Hand: Taxation and Corporate Governance 2 (March 2003) (unpublished
manuscript).
11
See COMMITTEE ON TAXATION OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND, INC., FACING THE TAX PROBLEM: A SURVEY OF
TAXATION IN THE UNITED STATES AND A PROGRAM FOR THE FUTURE 153-87 (1937) ("Twentieth Century Fund")
(surveying, in a chapter entitled “Control of Business Organization and Practices,” the New Deal program for the
regulation of corporations through the tax laws); MARK H. LEFF, THE LIMITS OF SYMBOLIC REFORM: THE NEW DEAL
AND TAXATION, 1933-1939 74-90 (1984).
12
See Revenue Act of 1935, §102(a), 49 Stat. 1014 (graduated marginal rates on corporations).
13
See id. at § 102(h) (reducing the dividends received deduction from one hundred to ninety percent); Revenue Act of
1936, § 26(b), 49 Stat. 1648 (reducing the dividends received deduction to eighty-five percent); Revenue Act of 1932, §
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the amount of executive compensation,14 to force the distribution of dividends,15 and to minimize
mergers, acquisitions, and other business combinations.16 While some of these corporate
governance-motivated proposals were enacted amid only mild opposition and remain a part of the
Code to this day,17 most were either rejected immediately or were repealed within a few years.18
As a case study on the use of tax provisions to regulate corporate governance, this Article
compares and contrasts two New Deal-era corporate tax provisions – the proposed abolition and
eventual overhaul of the tax-free reorganization provisions in the Revenue Act of 1934 and the
enactment of an undistributed profits tax in the Revenue Act of 1936 – where managerial
resistance spelled the difference between success and failure. The proposal to abolish or radically
alter the reorganization provisions, which governed the tax treatment of stock and property
received in mergers, consolidations, and other business combinations, aroused only limited
managerial opposition and the resulting provisions have survived virtually intact to this day. The
undistributed profits tax, on the other hand, was the target of a vigorous lobbying campaign and
was repealed after only a few years. Although both provisions were at least partially justified on
tax policy grounds, they had significant and publicly acknowledged implications for corporate
governance and for the independence of managers vis-à-vis their shareholders. In the former
case, elimination or tightening of the tax-free reorganization provisions as part of an effort to
restrict excessive business combinations potentially limited a manager’s ability to expand his
business through acquisitions. In the latter case, an undistributed profits tax designed to prevent
corporate “hoarding” of earnings and profits restricted the free cash flow managers’ counted on
for capital projects and cash acquisitions. Managerial opposition to both proposals may reflect
the problems associated with the shareholders’ delegation of authority to an agent – the manager
– who is imbued with self-interest,19 but agency cost theory does not entirely explain the
discrepancy in the degree of opposition. The question is why managers reacted so differently to
what appear to be similar threats to managerial independence.
While changes in the underlying political and economic environment played a role, this
Article suggests that the divergent reactions can at least partly be attributed to the extent to which

141(c) (additional tax of three-quarters of one percent for filing a consolidated return); National Industrial Recovery
Act of 1933, § 217(e) (raising the additional tax on consolidated returns to one percent); Revenue Act of 1934, § 141
(raising the additional tax on consolidated returns to two percent for railroad corporations and abolishing the right to
file consolidated returns for all other corporations).
14
See LEFF, supra note 11, at 87-89 (describing serious proposals in 1932 and 1934 to erect tax limits on executive
salaries).
15
See Revenue Act of 1936, § 14(b), 49 Stat. 1648, 1656 (undistributed profits tax).
16
See infra text accompanying notes 83-143.
17
See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 368 (tax-free reorganization provision), 243 (less than 100% exemption for dividends received by
some corporate shareholders), 11 (graduated marginal rate on corporations).
18
See, e.g., the abolition of the consolidated return and the imposition of an undistributed profits tax.
19
For a general discussion of the agency cost problem in the economics and finance literature, see Michael C. Jensen,
Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, and Takeovers, 76 AM. ECON. REV. 323 (1986); Frank H.
Easterbrook, Two Agency-Cost Explanations of Dividends, 74 AM. ECON. REV. 650 (1984); Eugene F. Fama, Agency
Problems and the Theory of the Firm, 88 J. POL. ECON. 288 (1980); Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory
of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976).
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each particular proposal threatened an underlying norm of corporate behavior.20 In the case of
reorganizations, Congress sought to influence transactions that were already regulated by both a
corporation’s by-laws and the laws of the state of incorporation. All major acquisitions or sales
were subject to unanimous shareholder approval in the early years of the corporation; by 1934, at
least majority approval was still necessary. Moreover, federal antitrust laws served as an
additional constraint on merger activity. Thus, there was no norm supporting a manger’s
unfettered discretion to engage in acquisitive transactions or to structure such transactions in the
manner most suitable to the manager’s needs. By contrast, dividends had always been a matter of
discretion for a corporation’s board of directors. While shareholders could seek redress for an
abuse of that discretion, directors were given wide latitude. Under then-existing norms, it was
considered prudent business practice to retain between thirty and fifty cents of every dollar
earned.21 Although some larger corporations already distributed in excess of that amount and the
undistributed profits tax as passed was designed to permit corporations to retain a significant
percentage of profits before the penalty tax was imposed, businesses of all sizes were concerned
about the threat to their control over corporate finances. Therefore, while both provisions were
opposed in part because they were potentially adverse to manager interests, one reason the
undistributed profits tax was resisted much more strongly was because it threatened the longstanding norm of managerial control over a corporation's finances.
This corporate norms-based explanation of managerial resistance provides valuable
insights for the use of tax as a tool of corporate governance. The implication is that tax measures
may reinforce existing norms, but are less likely to be successful in establishing new ones. This
may explain the fact that while most modern provisions have been nullified by managerial
opposition,22 some have been more accepted and therefore effective.23 Analyzing the underlying
norms threatened may also help provide a more reasoned basis for further use of the Code as a
tool to regulate corporate governance. In Part I and II, the Article chronicles the development of
the reorganization provision and undistributed profits tax proposals, respectively, considering
both their legislative histories and the managerial resistance at each stage. In Part III, the Article
explores the possible reasons why the two provisions took such divergent paths. While
20

There has been a recent explosion of interest among corporate law scholars in the field of norm theory. See
Symposium: Norms & Corporate Law, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1607 (2001). The term “norms” in this literature is
generally intended to denote non-legally enforceable conventions of behavior. But See Edward B. Rock & Michael L.
Wachter, Introduction, Symposium: Norms and Corporate Law, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1607, 1612-13 (2001) (suggesting
that legal scholars have used the term to refer to both legally and non-legally enforceable arrangements and suggesting
replacing the term “norms” with the phrase “nonlegally enforceable rules and standards” to end the confusion). In the
context of this article, however, the use of the term “norms” is meant to convey non-tax law conventions governing the
behavior of managers. Thus, it may mean both non-legally enforceable norms of manager behavior, such as those
dictated by market expectations, as well as legally enforceable norms, such as judicial decisions or state and federal
corporate laws governing corporate activity and manager discretion.
21
See SERGEI DOBROVOLSKY, CORPORATE INCOME RETENTION 1915-1943 13 (1951).
22
See Bruce A. Wolk, The Golden Parachute Provisions: Time for Repeal?, 21 VA. TAX REV. 125, 127 (2001); Steven
A. Bank, Devaluing Reform: The Derivatives Market and Executive Compensation, 7 DEPAUL BUS. L. J. 301, 332
(1995) (“Devaluing Reform”).
23

See Schizer, supra note 8, at 466.
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acknowledging the political and economic changes between 1934 and 1936, the Article focuses
on a previously unexplored phenomenon – the nature and status of the underlying corporate
behavior each proposal sought to regulate. The Article concludes by examining the possible
implications this analysis may have for modern attempts to use the Code to influence corporate
behavior.

II. TAX-FREE REORGANIZATION PROVISIONS
A.

Early history

The tax treatment of the participants to a merger, consolidation, or other reorganization
was an open question when the first post-Sixteenth Amendment income tax was adopted in
1913.24 Shareholders claimed that the exchange of stock in a business combination was a change
in form rather than substance, but nothing in the 1913 Act precluded their taxation.25 Treasury
officials initially appeared to side with shareholders,26 but soon issued regulations providing that
exchanges of property for stock might be taxable in certain circumstances.27 Congress eventually
resolved the issue as part of a general compromise over the timing of realization in property
exchanges.28 Under § 202(b) of the Revenue Act of 1918, reorganizations were deemed
realization events, but any gain or loss was deferred until a subsequent taxable sale.29 Although
this established the principle of the tax-free reorganization, the provision was flawed in several
respects.30 Most notably, nonrecognition treatment was limited to exchanges of stock having
equal par values and the provision failed to define the term “reorganization.”31
24

Tariff Act of 1913, ch. 16, 38 Stat. 114.
See RANDOLPH E. PAUL, STUDIES IN FEDERAL TAXATION: THIRD SERIES 8 (1940); Homer Hendricks, Federal Income
Tax: Definition of “Reorganization,” 45 HARV. L. REV. 648, 648 n.1 (1931); Hugh Satterlee, The Income Tax
Definition of Reorganization, 12 TAX MAG. 639, 639 (1934).
26
See GEORGE E. HOLMES, FEDERAL INCOME AND PROFITS TAXES 262 n.20 (1920) (citing Letter from Treasury Dep’t,
Mar. 8, 1917; I.T.S. 1918, par. 1302).
27
Treas. Reg. 33 (revised), arts. 101, 118, 119 (1918), 20 Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. 182, 187-88 (1918).
28
The compromise was between proponents of the consumption and accretion models of taxation. The accretion model
suggested annual taxation of increases in value, while the consumption model approved taxation only upon a sale in
which the proceeds were not reinvested. Shareholders claimed that the former option would work an injustice because
any gains realized were only “paper” gains, while Congress feared that the latter option would permit virtually
indefinite deferral of taxation. The reorganization provisions struck a balance between these two approaches by
acknowledging the paper gain problem, while recognizing that most types of property exchanges were taxable. See
Steven A. Bank, Mergers, Taxes, and Historical Realism, 75 TUL. L. REV. 1, 62-63 (2000) (“Mergers”).
29
Revenue Act of 1918, ch. 18, § 202(b), 40 Stat. 1058 (1919) (“[W]hen in connection with the reorganization, merger,
or consolidation of a corporation a person receives in place owned by him new stock or securities of no greater
aggregate par or face value, no gain or loss shall be deemed to occur from the exchange, and the new stock or securities
received shall be treated as taking the place of the stock, securities, or property exchanged.”).
30
See Steven A. Bank, Taxing Divisive and Disregarded Mergers, 34 GA. L. REV. 1523, 1550-51 (2000).
31
Id. Treasury attempted to address the latter flaw by issuing a regulation that outlined the types of transactions that
were eligible for nonrecognition treatment under § 202(b). Under Treas. Reg. § 45, nonrecognition treatment was
available for transactions “where two (or more) corporations unite their properties by either (a) the dissolution of
25
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The deficiencies in the first reorganization provision greatly limited its usefulness. As
one practitioner later recalled, "[t]he 1918 provisions were impracticable in operation; the then
status of the law was such as to hamper necessary business adjustments."32 This problem did not
escape Congress’ attention. In his testimony before the Senate Finance Committee in September
of 1921, Dr. T.S. Adams, an economic advisor to the Treasury Department,33 noted that “the
principal defect of the present law is in blocking desirable business readjustments.”34 According
to Adams, “[a]ll kinds of business readjustments had been stopped” due to the fear of being
subject to taxation and transaction activity would continue to stall without clarifying and
liberalizing the reorganization provisions.35
In the context of a post-World War I economic downturn, the concerns about a threat to
business reorganizations were understandable. A sharp drop in the artificially high wartime
prices, especially in the agricultural sector, ushered in an economic downturn between 1920 and
1922 that has been referred to as “the last of the ‘depressions’ before the catastrophe of 1929
occurred.”36 During 1921 alone, approximately 20,000 companies closed and almost five million
individuals were unemployed.37 A House Ways and Means Committee Report remarked that "the
exacting of the present excessive sums of taxes from the country contributes in no small degree to
the depressing influences under which business and industry in general are staggering as an
aftermath of the World War."38 The Committee explained that the financial ravages of war are
felt most acutely “after the cessation of hostilities, at which time the demand for war supplies
terminates, with a resulting shrinkage of values. The Nation is now passing through the trying
period of liquidation and readjustment. The reduction of the tax burdens is essential to business
recovery."39

corporation B and the sale of its assets to corporation A, or (b) the sale of its property by B to A and the dissolution of
B, or (c) the sale of the stock of B to A and the dissolution of B, or (d) the merger of B into A, or (e) the consolidation
of the corporations.” Treas. Reg. § 45, art. 1567, 21 Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. 170, 395. This was consistent with the
prevailing understanding of the term in the non-bankruptcy context. See Eric L. Kohler, Reorganizations and the
Federal Income Tax Law, 4 NAT’L INCOME TAX MAG. 161, 161 (May 1926) (“The current use of the term is reflected in
part by the definition offered seventeen years ago by Thomas W. Lamont: ‘a decision brought about usually by a
company’s success, to enlarge it, to recapitalize it, or to amalgamate it with some other corporation or corporations.”).
32
Hendricks, supra note 25, at 648 n.1.
33
Adams, a professor of political economy at Yale, is sometimes called the “father of the 1921 Act.” Ronald H.
Jensen, Of Form and Substance: Tax-Free Incorporations and Other Transactions Under Section 351, 11 VA. TAX
REV. 349, 383 n.117 (1991). He was the principal Treasury spokesperson before Congress on tax legislation and was
considered one of the foremost tax and public finance theorists of his day. See Michael J. Graetz & Michael M.
O’Hear, The “Original Intent” of U.S. International Taxation, 46 DUKE L.J. 1021, 1029-30 (1997).
34
Hearings on H.R. 8245 Before the Senate Comm. on Fin., 67th Cong. 29 (1921) (statement of Dr. T.S. Adams,
advisor to the Treasury Department).
35
Id.
36
CHARLES R. GEISST, WALL STREET: A HISTORY 155 (1997). See also PAUL, supra note 25, at 21; CHARLES A.
BEARD & MARY R. BEARD, I AMERICA IN MIDPASSAGE 28 (1939); Jensen, supra note 33, at 386 n.126.
37
Jensen, supra note 33, at 386 n.126.
38
H.R. REP. NO. 350, 67th Cong., 1st Sess. (1921), reprinted in 1939-1 C.B. 168.
39
Id.
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Furthermore, merger activity began to slow during this economic downturn. Although
the number and size of firms absorbed by merger increased steadily in 1919 and 1920,40 “the pace
of merger activity subsided somewhat in the depression of 1921.”41 It did not truly resume its
upward slope after this interruption until the mid-1920s.42 Sheldon Cohen, a former commissioner
of the Internal Revenue Service, concluded that “[i]n this historical context it is not at all
surprising that preferential treatment was accorded corporate mergers and consolidations on the
assumption that the provisions would” encourage business reorganizations.43
Thus, in the Revenue Act of 1921,44 Congress amended the reorganization provision to
address some of business’ concerns.45 Under § 202(c)(2) of the 1921 Act, “reorganization” was
defined to include “a merger or consolidation (including the acquisition by one corporation of at
least a majority of the voting stock and at least a majority of the total number of shares of all
other classes of stock of another corporation, or of substantially all the properties of another
corporation), recapitalization, or mere change in identity, form, or place of organization of a
corporation (however effected).”46 While this definition was itself flawed because it failed to
specify the permissible consideration in such transactions,47 from the perspective of business it
was a vast improvement over the 1918 version. As both the House Ways and Means and Senate
Finance Committees emphasized in their respective reports on the 1921 Act, the revised
reorganization provision “will, by removing a source of grave uncertainty . . . permit business to
go forward with the readjustments required by existing conditions.”48
The liberalization of the reorganization provisions continued in subsequent revenue
49
acts. The Revenue Act of 1924 expanded the definition of reorganization to include spin-offs

40

RALPH L. NELSON, MERGER MOVEMENTS IN AMERICAN INDUSTRY 1895-195637 tbl. 14.
J. KEITH BUTTERS ET AL., EFFECTS OF TAXATION: CORPORATE MERGERS 292 (1951).
42
JOHN M. BLAIR, ECONOMIC CONCENTRATION: STRUCTURE, BEHAVIOR AND PUBLIC POLICY 264 (1972).
43
Sheldon S. Cohen, Conglomerate Mergers and Taxation, 55 A.B.A. J. 41 (1969). The 1921 decision to create a
better environment for mergers and acquisitions should be distinguished from the 1918 decision to provide
nonrecognition treatment for reorganizations, which was based on the realization compromise between consumption
and accretion tax visions of the income tax system. See Bank, Mergers, supra note 28, at 28-34.
44
Revenue Act of 1921, ch. 136, 42 Stat. 227.
45
During the debates on a proposed amendment to the reorganization provision, one senator noted that “when so much
reorganization is going on in the business world, it is thought by all those interested in the upbuilding of the industries
of the country at this time that this is a very helpful provision.” 61 CONG. REC. 6563 (1921) (statement of Sen. Watson
regarding the removal of a provision requiring stock to be of equal par value to qualify for nonrecognition treatment).
46
Id. at § 202(c)(2).
47
One commentator referred to this omission as a “blunder of draftsmanship.” Valentine Brookes, The Continuity of
Interest in Reorganizations – A Blessing or a Curse, 34 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 5-6 (1946).
48
H.R. REP. NO. 67-350, at 10 (1921), reprinted in 1939-1 C.B. 168, 176; S. REP. NO. 67-275, at 11 (1921), reprinted
in 1939-1 C.B. 181, 189.
49
See Roswell Magill, Effect of Taxation on Corporate Policies, 72 U.S. L. Rev. 637, 639 (1938) (“[I]n the early
twenties, Congress regarded business reorganizations as frequently desirable and often necessary. Hence, successive
revenue laws contained increasingly liberal provisions, to permit corporations and stockholders to carry through taxfree, not only the kinds of reorganizations which the Supreme Court had passed upon, but a number of other kinds.”);
Income Tax on Corporate Reorganization, 2 N.Y. L. REV. 387, 390 (1924) (“The present statute, as well as that of
1921, was obviously designed to promulgate a policy more liberal to the taxpayer.”).
41
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and split-offs.50 One member of the House Ways and Means Committee explained to Congress
that this amendment was inserted "to include other usual forms of corporate reorganizations in the
advance of business, such as the splitting of one corporation into two or more corporations, which
I may say under the present law would not be permitted except by forming two entirely new
corporations."51 The 1924 Act also formally extended the exemption from taxation to
corporations so that they received the benefit of nonrecognition of any gain.52 Although a
Treasury interpretation had concluded that corporations were exempt under the 1921 Act, the
Senate Finance Committee explained that "[t]he present ruling of the Treasury Department on this
question is of doubtful legality and a statutory provision is most necessary."53 This expansion
was designed to further remove any limits placed on business readjustments by the tax law. The
House Ways and Means Committee explained that nonrecognition treatment was granted in order
to permit “ordinary business transactions” to go forward free from tax constraints and “[i]f it is
necessary for this reason to exempt from tax the gain realized by the stockholders, it is even more
necessary to exempt from tax the gain realized by the corporation."54 Finally, and perhaps most
importantly, the 1924 Act refined the definition of reorganization to make it exclusive for tax
purposes.55 This helped to provide the certainty businesses sought before engaging in
reorganizations.
There were two problems with the liberalization of the reorganization provisions. First, it
may have worked too well in encouraging businesses to combine. One practitioner noted that
reorganizations became “almost, if not actually, a fetish with many business men and certain
short- sighted, so-called tax counselors.”56 This contributed to a marked increase in business
combinations. Of the 92 active holding companies whose stock was listed on the New York
Stock Exchange in 1928, 66 had been granted charters since 1910 and, of those companies, at
50
Revenue Act of 1924, 43 Stat. 253 (June 2, 1924), § 203(h)(1) (the term "reorganization means (B) a transfer by a
corporation of all or part of its assets to another corporation if immediately after the transfer the transferor or its
stockholders or both are in control of the corporation to which the assets are transferred"). A “spin-off” involves a
contribution by a corporation of some or all of its assets to another corporation, followed by a distribution of the stock
of that corporation to all of the first corporation’s existing shareholders as a dividend. A “split-off” is the same
transaction as a spin-off except instead of distributing the new corporation’s stock as a dividend, the stock is distributed
to certain of the first corporation’s shareholders in exchange for their stock in the original corporation. The result is
two separate corporations with two separate groups of shareholders. See 1 MARTIN D. GINSBURG & JACK S. LEVIN,
MERGERS, ACQUISITIONS, AND BUYOUTS par. 1001 (2001).
51
65 CONG. REC. 2429 (1924) (statement of Rep. Green).
52
See Revenue Act of 1924, 43 Stat. 253 (June 2, 1924), § 203(b)(3) ("No gain or loss shall be recognized if a
corporation a party to a reorganization exchanges property, in pursuance of a plan of reorganization, solely for stock or
securities in another corporation a party to the reorganization.").
53
S. REP. NO. 398, 68th Cong., 1st Sess (1924), reprinted in 1939-1 C.B. at 276. See also Milton Sandberg, The
Income Tax Subsidy to “Reorganizations,” 38 COLUM. L. REV. 98, 102-03 (1938). A regulation promulgated under the
1921 Act had construed the reorganization provisions so as to exempt corporations as well as their shareholders. Treas.
Reg. 62, Art. 1566(b), 24 Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. 499-500 (1922).
54
H.R. REP. NO. 179, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. (1924), reprinted in 1939-1 C.B. at 250.
55
The 1924 Act replaced the phrase “the word ‘reorganization’ includes . . .,” with the phrase “the word
‘reorganization’ means . . ..” 43 Stat. 257.
56
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least 34 had received their charters between 1923 and 1928.57 Furthermore, during 1928 and
1929, mergers were occurring at a far more rapid pace than at the beginning of the decade or at
any time during the more famous merger movement at the turn-of-the-century.58 Of the 8500
acquisitions of formerly independent manufacturing and mining businesses between the end of
World War I and the end of 1931, more than 4800 occurred between 1926 and 1930 and almost
2300 disappeared in 1928 and 1929 alone.59
Economic concentration accompanied this revived period of merger and consolidation.
Between 1922 and 1929, there were eight mergers valued at over $100 million and at least
fourteen transactions in which the target corporation had assets valued at over $50 million.60 By
1932, Adolf Berle and Gardiner Means reported that “perhaps two-thirds of the industrial wealth
of the country [has passed] from individual ownership to ownership by large, publicly-financed
corporations.”61 In his famous dissent in the Louis K. Ligget case, Justice Brandeis described the
extent of this economic concentration: “200 nonbanking corporations, each with assets in excess
of $90,000,000, control directly about one-fourth of all our national wealth.”62 One study
concluded that "the merger movement of the 1920s not only significantly increased over-all levels
of concentration but did so to a substantial extent" in certain key industry groups.63
After the stock market crash in October of 1929, there was a tendency to place at least
part of the blame for the ensuing economic crisis on the “excessive” business combinations and
resulting economic concentration of the 1920s.64 As Paul Conkin reports, this blame was
probably misplaced. “Numerous corporate consolidations increased efficiency even as they
narrowed participation in key managerial choices.”65 The broad impact of the crash, however,
made the reality irrelevant for a Congress seeking to blunt its bitter effects. “The statutes which
‘permitted necessary business adjustments’ in 1921” became from the post-Crash perspective of
the 1930s, “one of the major and indispensable forces in the thrust towards economic
concentration which characterized the ‘twenties.”66
Second, the liberalized reorganization provisions opened the door to reorganizations
motivated primarily by a desire to reduce taxes. This was primarily due to poor drafting – the
reorganization provisions were overly detailed and yet still ambiguous in important ways.
Although the Revenue Act of 1921 included what legislators thought to be “comprehensive”
reorganization provisions, taxpayers soon took advantage of the many deficiencies and gaps in
57
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Id. at 294.
61
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Louis K. Liggett Co., 288 U.S. at 566 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
63
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64
Louis K. Liggett Co., 288 U.S. at 566-67 (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (“Other writers have shown that, coincident with
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65
PAUL K. CONKIN, THE NEW DEAL 23 (2d ed. 1975).
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(7/13/2004)

TAX, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, AND NORMS

11

drafting.67 After extensive study, Congress concluded in 1924 that the relatively sparse
reorganization provisions should be greatly expanded to specify the exact nature of each
requirement for qualifying under the statute.68 The resulting revenue act was called one of “the
most detailed and precise statutes which had been evolved up to that time.”69 Randolph Paul
remarked that the reorganization provisions “on their face appeared sufficient to capture the most
elusive quarry.”70
The detail of the reorganization provisions proved a mirage for those eager to stop abuse.
Creative tax practitioners located loopholes in even the most explicit of clauses and openly
devised transactions that complied with the letter if not the spirit of the statute. One practitioner
described the wide variety of reorganizations that were used to reduce taxable income: “New
corporations were established out of old with the assurance of larger deductions for depreciation;
corporations on the verge of liquidation were reorganized so that earned surplus and surplus to be
earned upon dissolution might be absorbed in larger issues of stock, and then dissolved without
taxable profit except possibly to stockholders. Elaborate projects were evolved whereby surplus
cash was to be passed on to stockholders as a partial ‘liquidation’ of their shares. Common law
trusts were established by the score.”71 While the courts helped shut down a number of the
schemes occasioned by loopholes and overly tight drafting,72 taxpayers won a fair number of the
cases and even more probably went undetected.73
B.
1.

New Deal

Subcommittee Proposal

As Roosevelt settled into the presidency in 1933, Congress was in the process of
investigating the causes of the stock market crash and Great Depression. During the highly
publicized Pecora hearings before the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency,74 named after
Ferdinand Pecora, the aggressive lead counsel for the Committee,75 there were allegations of
67

PAUL, supra note 25, at 37.
See Id; Satterlee, supra note 25, at 640.
69
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640.
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PAUL, supra note 25, at 37.
71
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Tax Mag. 245 (1931) (describing the possibility of acquiring cost rather than carryover basis in a reorganization).
72
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Corporation Laws, 77 N.C. L. REV. 1307, 1336-39 (1999) (describing cases) ("Federalizing the Tax-Free Merger").
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widespread misconduct and questionable actions by investment bankers and corporate managers.
Some of these accusations related to the disabling of typical corporate governance mechanisms in
connection with mergers and acquisitions. In one device, the Pennsylvania Railroad financed a
holding company by issuing “voting trust certificates” rather than stock so it could amass the
financial resources to engage in strategic acquisitions of smaller railroad lines without being
subject to stockholder oversight.76
An investment banker involved in organizing the
Pennsylvania Railroad holding company candidly testified that all such efforts to deprive
stockholders of control were “inventions of the devil.”77
Other corporate governance practices highlighted during the Pecora hearings related to
the impropriety of executive compensation or dividend declarations. With respect to the former
issue, several Senators grilled Albert Wiggin, the former chairman of the board of directors at
Chase National Bank, about the size and source of his income, noting that “[t]hey credited you
with being responsible for some of their added profits in the good years” by paying large
bonuses, but “[i]n bad years [they failed to] charge you in any way with responsibility for
losses.”78 As Wiggin later conceded under questioning, he alone determined his bonus and the
board served as little more than a rubber stamp.79 With respect to the latter issue, Pecora
questioned the director of Fox Film Corporation over its declaration of a $4 million dividend to
its principal stockholder, the General Theaters Equipment, in a year when it sustained a loss of
more than $5.5 million.80 Senator Couzens noted that this was particularly suspicious given the
“very close affiliation between the General Theaters Equipment and the management of the Fox
Film Corporation” and the fact that Fox was heavily in debt at the time.81 While it is not entirely
clear that the practice in either case was improper, the investigation into these cases and other
similar incidents indicated Congress’ heightened concern over the internal governance of the
corporation.
This inquiry into Wall Street’s contribution to the stock market crash and the ensuing
Depression was accompanied by revelations of rampant tax evasion. According to one account,
not only had the world-renowned financier J.P. Morgan paid no income taxes during 1931 and
1932, none of the partners in his investment house had either.82 While much of this was
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Id. at 3813.
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perfectly legal,83 Congress was looking for scapegoats and the richer the better. Thus, against the
backdrop of an investigation that “had whipped up public outrage against corporate abuses,”84 the
House authorized a thorough study of the internal revenue system in order to ferret out evasion
and simplify the tax laws.85
The resulting House Subcommittee report issued in December of 1933 reflected these
dual themes of tax avoidance and corporate excesses.86 At the press conference to announce the
release of the Subcommittee report, the New York Times observed that the “[c]hanges sought are
aimed principally at persons whose incomes are in the higher brackets as well as at corporations
now legally permitted to take advantage of what committee members said were ‘unfair but legal’
provisions of the revenue laws.”87 One such apparently “unfair but legal” revenue law was the
tax-free reorganization provisions. In its report, the Subcommittee recommended eliminating the
tax-free reorganization in order to “close the door to one of the most prevalent methods of tax
avoidance.”88 Although nonrecognition treatment was premised on the principle that tax is
deferred rather than exempted, the report noted that “the taxpayer is able to escape tax on these
gains entirely by being permitted to elect the year in which he shall report such gain.”89
While the Subcommittee’s report prominently cited the tax avoidance rationale,90 it also
disclosed an underlying corporate governance motivation for its recommendation. In a separate
memorandum attached to the report, the Subcommittee provided more detailed justification for
repeal of the tax-free reorganization provisions.91 It acknowledged that one of the rationales for
liberalizing the reorganization provisions during the early 1920s was to remove the obstacles to
“normal business readjustments,” but concluded that this rationale was no longer salient.92 “[T]he
present provisions,” the report observed, “have encouraged the injection into business structure of
83

LEFF, supra note 11, at 59 (suggesting the tax consequences were the result of capital loss carryforwards); PECORA,
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an unsavory stimulus, such as the organization of large holding companies and the
overcapitalization of business.”93 In effect, the Subcommittee report endorsed withdrawing the
reorganization provisions as a means of stemming the tide of business combination and economic
concentration.
The characterization of the reorganization provisions as an “unsavory stimulus” to the
creation of holding companies was part of a general attack on such forms of corporate
organization. One of the Subcommittee’s many recommendations was to eliminate the provisions
permitting an affiliated group of corporations to file a consolidated federal income tax return.94
As the report acknowledged,95 this was the culmination of a continuing controversy in Congress
over consolidated returns and the dangers of holding companies. Holding companies, or
corporations whose assets consisted of the stock of subsidiary corporations, were often
considered vehicles for the predatory activities of trusts and chain stores.96 In 1932, after
rejecting a similar proposal to abolish the consolidated return,97 Congress levied a small tax on
the privilege of filing as a consolidated group.98 According to the Subcommittee, however, this
surcharge was no longer sufficient to offset the tax advantages provided to corporate families
under the consolidated return provisions. “In the past, when any corporation could carry forward
a net loss from one year to another, the consolidated group did not have such a great advantage
over the separate corporation. Now that this net-loss carry-over has been denied, the advantage
of the consolidated return is much greater on a comparative basis.”99 Thus, the Subcommittee
proposal to eliminate the consolidated return, like the proposal to abolish the tax-free
reorganization, was an attack on the holding company system.100
At the subsequent House Ways and Means Committee hearings, corporate managers
opposed the Subcommittee’s recommendations,101 but they were noticeably muted in their
reaction to the proposal to abolish the reorganization provisions. James Emery of the National
Association of Manufacturers generically pleaded “[w]e venture particularly at this time the
suggestion that the national tax policy, for the most practical reasons, should encourage new
investment rather than discourage it by radical change. The development of new or the expansion
of existing forms of business, means a new or enlarged contribution to the shrunken public
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purse.”102 Although this statement could be construed as an indictment of the proposal to
eliminate the tax-free reorganization provisions, Emery made no mention of this proposal.103
Only the United States Chamber of Commerce specifically opposed the proposal to eliminate the
reorganization provisions. It noted that “[e]xchanges, modifications of capital structure and
consolidations undertaken in the interest of better operating conditions and as a means of
expanding business activity should not be penalized but should be encouraged. This is especially
true at the present time when many reorganizations are unescapable as a result of the depression.
Reorganizations which are necessary to business recovery and increased employment will not be
undertaken if an immediate tax liability is imposed.”104 Even this expression of opposition,
however, was a part of a prepared statement submitted in lieu of live testimony.105 No speaker
actually devoted any of his allotted time to the reorganization proposal.106
Part of the silence on the reorganization provisions may have been due to the fact that
Treasury was already doing most of the heavy labor in opposing the Subcommittee
recommendations.107 Acting Treasury Secretary Henry Morgenthau issued a statement regarding
the Subcommittee report at the start of the Ways and Means hearings.108 Morgenthau agreed with
the Subcommittee that the reorganization provisions are both complex and “open to the serious
objection of being overspecific,”109 but concluded that the provisions should be “completely
redrafted” rather than abandoned entirely.110 Treasury believed that the elimination of the
reorganization provisions would simply afford taxpayers an opportunity to claim losses, both
immediately and over time in the former of higher bases for depreciation and depletion
deductions, with the result that “the proposal would not only yield no additional revenue, but
would result in a net loss.”111 While corporate managers did not reference the Treasury statement
102
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in supporting their own testimony, it may have allowed them to focus on those recommendations
Treasury did not choose to contest.
The problem with this explanation is that business leaders questioned a number of the
Subcommittee recommendations that Treasury had already rejected in its own statement. For
instance, Treasury concluded that the Subcommittee proposal to abolish consolidated returns
“might well be a backward step, which would result in little, if any, additional revenue.”112
According to Treasury, full recognition of intercompany transactions would be just as likely to
result in deductible losses as gains and would incur considerable administrative expenses for both
the government and the taxpayer.113
This strong repudiation of the Subcommittee
recommendation, however, did not prevent a number of witnesses from raising the consolidated
return issue in their own testimony. The National Association of Manufacturers noted that the
consolidated return “merely recognizes the separate corporate entities which are working parts of
one business created for convenience and necessity, developed out of experience, and recognized
by the States of the Union.”114 Similarly, M.L. Seidman of the New York Board of Trade
protested that “[t]o shut one’s eyes to the position of a particular company in a group, and to
insist that every corporation in that group file separate returns, would be to encourage artificial
business arrangements and to distort normal and natural intercompany accounting methods.”115
2.

House

Despite the lack of public protest from business leaders and Subcommittee Chairman
Hill’s confident predictions that its recommendations would prevail,116 the full House Ways and
Means Committee sided with Treasury on the reorganization question. In its report submitted in
February of 1934, the Committee stated that “under present conditions, the wiser policy is to
amend the provisions drastically to stop the known cases of tax avoidance, rather than to
eliminate the sections completely. This decision will further avoid the period of litigation and
uncertainty which would necessarily follow a complete reversal of the established policy.”117
This apparent victory for corporate managers did not mean that the Committee sought to
continue encouraging reorganizations. In fact, under the Committee’s proposal, the number of
transactions in which reorganization status was available would be severely limited to “(1)
statutory mergers and consolidations; (2) transfers to a controlled corporation, ‘control’ being
defined as an 80 per cent ownership; and (3) changes in the capital structure or form of
112
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organization.”118 According to its report, “the definition of reorganization has been restricted so
that the definition will conform more closely to the general requirements of corporation law.”119
This admittedly “drastic” amendment to the reorganization provisions once again
provoked little protest on the part of corporate managers.120 In the House, this was partly because
the Ways and Means Committee pushed for the passage of a special rule prohibiting all
amendments other than those offered by members of the Committee.121 According to
Representative Robert Doughton, the Chair of the Committee, “[i]t is the only practical way to
bring out the bill. It is a good bill, and if it is opened to amendments it won’t be as good when
passed as it now is.”122 The apparent rationale for the rule was to block any amendments seeking
to scrap the whole income tax in favor of a sales tax,123 but the practical result was to secure
passage of the bill with little debate on the floor of the House and shift protest on individual
proposals to the Senate.124
3.

Senate

Passage of the House bill did stir corporate managers to protest, but the protest was still
relatively limited. While the bill headed to the Senate Finance Committee, the U.S. Chamber of
Commerce once again issued a statement decrying the proposed changes, including those to the
reorganization provision. This statement, however, was only a slightly revised version of the one
it submitted during the Ways and Means Committee hearings. According to the Chamber, “[n]o
tax should be imposed on exchanges or reorganizations unless there is a clearly realized gain.
Reorganization and mergers made necessary, in view of economic conditions, as a matter of good
business policy, should not be discouraged or precluded by additional taxation.”125 The Chamber
allowed for some possibility of minor changes, but argued against anything more radical: “The
question of mergers and reorganizations in relation to Federal income taxes has always been a
118
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complex one. The present provisions have been in the law practically unchanged since 1918 and
taken as a whole are sound. Any substantial change will result in confusion and uncertainty.”126
Corporate managers issued similar statements of opposition to the House bill’s proposed
treatment of reorganization provisions during the Senate Finance Committee Hearings. As in the
House hearings, however, few witnesses addressed the issue and most of those who did only did
so in their written statements.127 The one exception was David Gaskill on behalf of the Cleveland
Chamber of Commerce.128 While he discussed a proposed limit on the deductibility of capital
losses first,129 he did raise the reorganization provision in his testimony. Gaskill stated that “[t]he
bill, as passed by the House, took out the so-called ‘parenthetical clause’, and limits the definition
to statutory mergers and consolidations. We take the position that with that eliminated, the bill is
now indefinite and a substantial amount of litigation will be necessary in order to find out just
what is and what is not a statutory consolidation or merger.”130 As Senator Harrison appeared to
recognize when he questioned Gaskill about his claims,131 and the Cleveland Chamber of
Commerce implied in its written statement,132 the predicted litigation would most likely result
from managers’ attempts to characterize stock and asset acquisitions – previously parenthetical
clause transactions – as statutory mergers and consolidations.
Aside from the Cleveland Chamber of Commerce, no other party addressed the
reorganization provision in their testimony. The United States Chamber of Commerce submitted
both a prepared brief and report in which the House’s reorganization provision was criticized, but
much of this was essentially a repeat of the objections raised by the Cleveland Chamber of
Commerce. In its brief, the Chamber warned “[t]he provision affecting mergers or consolidations
of corporations will result in confusion, and will discourage mergers which, in the view of recent
economic conditions should be made in the interests of good business policies, and because of the
lessened number of mergers, revenues will probably decrease.”133 Its accompanying report
elaborated on such concerns, emphasizing the view that the House proposal would severely limit
the tax-free reorganization: “The apparent effect of this amendment will be to eliminate the most
usual and important form of reorganization, leaving only comparatively restricted and technical
forms permissible without tax.”134 According to the Chamber’s report, the cause of the confusion
126
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would be that the meanings of the terms merger and consolidation would “have to be determined
in various instances by the laws of the particular State which might be applicable in the case.
What would be a merger or consolidation in one State might not be in another. Instead, then, of
having uniform principles generally applicable to all corporations, there would be different
standards applicable to different corporations.”135
This latter argument proved to be convincing to the Senate Finance Committee – or at
least it sounded reasonable enough to use as its official justification for the rejection of the
House’s more radical amendments. In its report, the Senate Finance Committee noted that it was
“in complete agreement with the purposes of the House Bill,” but indicated that “some
modifications are recommended in order to bring about a more uniform application of the
provisions in all 48 of the States. Not all of the States have adopted statutes providing for
mergers or consolidations; and, moreover, a corporation of one State can not ordinarily merge
with a corporation of another State.”136 Since “some legitimate and desirable business
readjustments would be prevented” by limiting nonrecognition treatment to statutory mergers, the
Finance Committee proposed a broader definition of “reorganization.”137 Thus, in addition to the
statutory merger or consolidation and other transactions proposed under the House bill, the Senate
Finance Committee proposed to include the following transaction within the definition of
reorganization: “the acquisition by one corporation in exchange solely for all or part of its voting
stock: of at least 80 per centum of the voting stock and at least 80 per centum of the total number
of shares of all other classes of stock of another corporation; or of substantially all the properties
of another corporation.”138 The Committee noted that “these transactions, when carried out as
prescribed in this amendment, are in themselves sufficiently similar to mergers and
consolidations as to be entitled to similar treatment.”139
The Senate Finance Committee proposal provided for a more expansive reorganization
definition than the one passed by the House, but contemporary observers still thought it had been
“sharply modified” from the existing provisions.140 As the Committee noted, it required the
acquisition of 80% of the target corporation stock.141 Ever since the parenthetical clause was
inserted into the reorganization provision in the 1921 Act, Congress had only required the
acquisition of a majority of the target corporation stock.142 Moreover, both the asset and stock
acquisitions would only be entitled to nonrecognition treatment if the property or stock were
135
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exchanged “solely for the voting stock of the acquiring corporation.”143 Not only had the former
parenthetical clause not imposed a similar voting stock requirement, it had not specified the
consideration at all. One commentator called this “[p]erhaps the most radical change” to the
reorganization provisions.144
Notwithstanding the significant changes to emerge from the Senate Finance Committee,
corporate managers made no protest and the measure sailed through the Senate.145 Within a few
weeks the House conferees accepted the Senate proposal on the reorganization provisions. After
little debate in either the House or the Senate over the Conference Report, the bill was signed into
law in May of 1934.146 Not only did the Revenue Act of 1934, or more specifically its changes to
the reorganization provision, provoke little opposition on the part of corporate managers,147 most
of its major statutory innovations have endured to this day.148
II.

UNDISTRIBUTED PROFITS TAX

Just two years after the relatively mild reaction to a proposal to restrict a manager's ability to do a
tax-free merger, there was a very different reaction to a proposal to limit their discretion over
dividend policy.
A.

Early history

Ever since an income tax was first imposed during the Civil War and Reconstruction,
Congress has struggled with how to reach the undistributed profits of a corporation. During the
nineteenth century, undistributed profits were taxed as a way to ensure that corporations would
not evade dividend taxes by simply accumulating, rather than distributing, their earnings. Thus,
in 1864, Congress used an undistributed profits tax as an enforcement mechanism for its taxation
of the dividends issued by corporations in certain industries.149 The House revived the
undistributed profits tax in 1894 when it passed a bill imposing a dividends tax.150 Such efforts
143
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were not controversial, however, because the norm was for corporations to distribute virtually all
of their profits as dividends.151
After passage of the Sixteenth Amendment,152 Congress once again employed the
undistributed profits tax concept, but only as a penalty provision. Under the Tariff Act of
1913,153 shareholders were subject to a tax on their undistributed profits when the corporation was
found to have unreasonably accumulated profits for the purpose of evading the high surtax rates
on individual income.154 This pass-through undistributed profits tax remained in place until it
was deemed to be unconstitutional under the realization requirement announced in Eisner v.
Macomber.155 In subsequent years, the undistributed profits tax was applied directly to the
corporation when the purpose of the accumulation was to evade the surtaxes on individual income
or when the corporation was formed for the purpose of evading the surtaxes.156 Because of the
tax’s intent requirement, however, the provision was often not enforced during the early years of
the income tax.157
Perhaps recognizing the inherent problems with the use of the undistributed profits tax as
a penalty provision, various individuals and groups forwarded proposals to broaden the tax’s
scope. In 1917, Senator Andrieus Jones of New Mexico proposed to tax corporations on a certain
percentage of their undistributed profits regardless of the purpose for the retention.158 While a
bill introduced by the Senate Finance Committee to adopt this proposal was rejected, the Senate
eventually adopted something similar to Jones’ original suggestion in an amendment to the
Revenue Act of 1924 before it was removed in the House.159 In 1928, the Joint Committee on
Internal Revenue Taxation revived the undistributed profits tax proposal, but Congress rejected it
amid concerns about making such a radical change during a period of business expansion.160

income or gains of any bank, trust company, savings institution, and of any fire, marine, life, inland insurance
company, either stock or mutual, under whatever name or style known or called in the United States or
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Revenue Act of 1936

Prelude to an undistributed profits tax

Even before he was elected for the first time in 1932, President Roosevelt’s advisors had
urged him to consider the possibility of an undistributed profits tax. As he was campaigning for
the presidency, Roosevelt’s small circle of policy advisors – the “Brain Trust” as they came to be
called – were hard at work developing methods of stabilizing the economy and preventing a
repeat of the 1929 stock market crash.161 In a memorandum to then-Governor Roosevelt, the
Brain Trusters outlined what would become the foundation for the New Deal.162 Although the
memorandum identified many culprits for the depression, it laid much of the blame on the
unreasonable accumulation of corporate profits. According to the memorandum, the prosperity of
the Twenties led to “a greater accumulation of surpluses than were ever before realized in
economic history.”163 This practice of “corporate hoarding,” the memorandum charged, “upset
the balance of production and consumption” and contributed both to the crash and the ensuing
Depression.164 Roosevelt’s advisors recommended a “tax on undistributed surplus income of
corporations” as a means of “forcing undistributed surplus into the general market for capital.”165
While Roosevelt clearly endorsed the basic principles underlying the recommendation,166
he did not push for the enactment of an undistributed profits tax until two events prompted a
budgetary crisis arose at the end of his first term of office. First, the Supreme Court struck down
the Agricultural Adjustment Act and consequently invalidated the processing taxes Roosevelt had
counted on to finance the Act’s operations.167 Second, Congress overrode a presidential veto to
161
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accelerate payment on World War I veterans’ bonuses from 1945 to 1936.168 The combined
result of these two events was a $620 million shortfall in the president’s budget.169 To address
this shortfall, Roosevelt and his advisors once again turned to the undistributed profits tax.170
On March 3, Roosevelt addressed Congress in a supplemental budget message.171
Ostensibly, the message was merely to announce the need for an additional $620 million in
revenue to replace the processing taxes and fund the veterans’ bonuses. Roosevelt made a point
of acknowledging Congress’ discretion to determine the appropriate means to raise such
revenue.172 His true aim, however, was to push his proposal for an undistributed profits tax.173 In
advocating for the undistributed profits tax, Roosevelt did not mention its potential as a check on
corporate managers and a stimulus to the economy. Roosevelt instead emphasized its two more
politically saleable features:174 (1) its ability to equalize the treatment of all business owners, and
(2) its promise to “stop ‘leaks’ in present surtaxes.”175 One particular novel aspect of Roosevelt’s
proposal was that it was designed not to serve as it had in the past as a penalty tax, but rather as a
replacement for the corporate income tax.176 Distributed income would be subject to one layer of
tax while retained income would bear both a corporate and shareholder-level tax.
Unlike the proposal to abolish the reorganization provisions in 1934, the undistributed
profits tax proposal aroused “deep opposition” on the part of corporate managers.177 Alfred
Buehler reported, “[t]he business world . . . was aghast at the proposal and shuddered at the
consequences if it were adopted.”178 Under then-prevailing dividend practices, the tax could not
possibly raise the required $620 million in revenue.179 Thus, the rates would have to be set high
enough to “compel[] corporations radically to alter their present dividend policy” in order to
reach its revenue goals.180 This would force many corporations to rely more heavily on expensive
and intrusive external financing sources, something managers are generally disinclined to do
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especially when the alternative is simply to dip into retained earnings.181 Managers were perhaps
most offended by the fact that a forced change in dividend policy would substitute “the blanket
judgment of Congress and the Treasury Department, based on a general theory” for the
“individual judgment of business managers, based on their direct knowledge of the needs of their
particular company.”182
2.

House

Corporate managers were initially restrained in their public responses to the President’s
message,183 but this quickly changed as the undistributed profits tax concept was transformed into
a concrete proposal. Under the bill as it was presented to the House Ways and Means Committee,
the corporate income tax would be replaced by an undistributed profits tax graduated according to
the percentage of net income retained.184 For corporations with annual net income of $10,000 or
less, the rates ranged from 1% on the first 10% of undistributed net income to 29.7% on
undistributed net income of 70.3% or more.185 For corporations with annual income in excess of
$10,000, the bill proposed rates ranging from 4% on the first 10% of undistributed net income to
a maximum of 42.5% on undistributed net income of 57.5% or more.186 “Undistributed net
income” was defined to include adjusted net income less taxable dividends and the undistributed
profits tax itself.187 The bill exempted or provided special treatment for banks, insurance
companies, corporations in receivership, foreign corporations and corporations that were
contractually or legally prohibited from paying dividends.188 Finally, the bill subjected dividends
to the normal tax on individuals.189
Despite Internal Revenue Commissioner Guy Helvering’s declaration that “[t]here is no
intention or desire whatever to interfere with the internal management of business enterprises,”190
corporate managers showed up in force at the Ways and Means hearings to testify against the
181
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proposal. Unlike in 1934, however, the large trade associations presented oral testimony against
the undistributed profits tax rather than reserving the issue for their written statements.191
Moreover, these trade groups often sent multiple representatives to testify against different
aspects of the proposal. Three speakers, for example, represented the United States Chamber of
Commerce, with their combined testimony consuming more than seventy-five pages of the
transcribed hearings.192
Not only did the national trade associations devote a substantial portion of their allotted
time to the undistributed profits tax proposal, they were harsh in their criticism. Noel Sargent,
secretary of the National Association of Manufacturers, argued that the retention of corporate
profits produced benefits ranging from an increase in stockholder value and industrial
employment from the expansion of plant operations to the preservation of working capital and the
protection against depression.193 Fred Clausen of the United States Chamber of Commerce was
even more candid in his opposition, warning that “[t]his proposal would cause corporate
management to be controlled, in its decisions on fiscal policy, by fear of government exactions
rather than by good business judgment.”194 Clausen predicted that the tax “would engender such
uncertainties concerning the sound course to pursue as to subject the management to grave
difficulties with shareholders and creditors. . . . You can well imagine the difficulties facing
management and the board of directors in a company as to how to meet a situation which would
exist if this proposal becomes the law of the land.”195 According to Clausen, “[i]t presents the
danger that corporate management would be subject to serious criticism and even law suits if
liberal dividend policies were followed to escape taxes and gave rise to charges of dissipation of
assets.”196
Many smaller national, regional, and local trade groups joined the National Association
of Manufacturers and the U.S. Chamber of Commerce in testifying against the tax. The chairman
of the tax committee of the Illinois Manufacturing Association warned of the “grave danger that
the present highly capitalized organizations will have a continuing advantage over these small
corporations” by virtue of the imposition of the tax.197 R.C. Fulbright of the Southern Pine
Association echoed this charge, stating that “[w]e consider that it would be a very great detriment
to our smaller companies unless some what can be found to protect the company that is heavily
indebted or the company that must in order to keep going make needed improvements.”198 As a
191
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representative of the Detroit Board of Commerce summarized, “a tried system of taxation is much
better than a new system of taxation.”’199
Perhaps more significant than the trade association testimony was that, unlike in 1934,
business was not content to let its representatives speak for it. A parade of individual
businessmen appeared before the Ways and Means Committee to testify against the tax. Some of
these witnesses were from small businesses that felt threatened by the tax. The president of a
bridge corporation testified “[t]he smaller companies have only grown by using their earned
surplus in the building of larger facilities and in increasing their working capital the necessary
amount to take care of the increased capacity.”200 Not only were such companies concerned
about their ability to grow, they argued that the tax would prevent them from repaying their
existing bank indebtedness.201 Other witnesses appeared to represent the concerns of larger
companies. One attorney noted that “[s]ince 70 percent of the earnings of [publicly owned
companies] are distributed without regard to the tax brackets of the stockholders, and since the
earnings of [privately owned companies] are distributed only after careful consideration of the tax
brackets of its stockholders,” the committee should distinguish between public and private
corporations in applying the tax.202
During their testimony, Treasury representatives attempted to allay corporate managers’
fears.203 First, they pointed out that the tax would still permit accumulation of a fairly significant
surplus.204 According to Oliphant, corporations might be able to retain 20% and 30% of their
earnings under the proposal.205 Second, Treasury officials suggested corporations could satisfy
their capital needs through debt and equity financing, or, where those methods were
199
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unavailable,206 by retaining funds through the issuance of taxable stock dividends.207 Recent
judicial decisions had confirmed the possibility that a corporation could issue a type of stock
dividend that would be considered taxable to the stockholder, but would permit the corporation to
retain the underlying funds.208
Treasury’s responses appeared sufficient to satisfy any lingering concerns on the part of
most Committee members. Despite opponents’ urgings to proceed slowly before pursuing such a
“radical change” in the system of taxing corporate income,209 the undistributed profits tax
emerged from the Committee and quickly passed in the House with surprisingly little dissent.210
Much of this apparent lack of interest was due to the Republicans’ decision to avoid prolonging
consideration of an issue that was likely to face stiffer opposition in the Senate.211
3.

Senate

Although opponents were initially emboldened by reports that even pro-Administration
members of the Senate Finance Committee were dissatisfied with the House bill,212 the
overwhelming approval of the bill in the House caused such optimism to waver.213 Thus, even
before the Senate Finance Committee began hearings on the proposed undistributed profits tax,
corporate managers and their representatives redoubled their efforts to oppose the bill. The
Chamber of Commerce of the State of New York issued a report sharply condemning the tax: “In
practice this proposed tax involves serious Federal interference with business management. It is a
scheme to force the distribution of corporate profits regardless of the policy dictated by sound
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business judgment.”214 Similarly strong statements emerged from the annual meeting of the
United States Chamber of Commerce, where it adopted a resolution decrying the undistributed
profits tax as an attempt “to regulate the management of corporations.”215
Once the Senate Finance Committee hearings began, business leaders appeared in even
greater numbers than during the House Ways and Means Committee hearings to testify against
the undistributed profits tax. Whereas fifty-one non-governmental speakers testified on the bill
during the House hearings, nearly double that number – ninety-four – testified before the Senate
Finance Committee.216 The Senate Finance Committee also received letters from another fortythree individuals or organizations, while the House Ways and Means Committee received only
fourteen such written statements or letters.217 Some of the increase in the number of people
testifying on the bill was attributable to the Senate’s consideration of a proposal to impose a new
processing tax.218 Nevertheless, the primary topic for most witnesses was the undistributed
profits tax. Although they advocated relegating the tax to a subordinate role if Congress insisted
on adopting it,219 they maintained a steadfast opposition to the entire concept. The principal
complaint was that the tax would interfere with normal business operations. Managers’ concerns
ranged from the specific concern that the tax would upset the “regularity of dividend” to the more
general worry “over the uncertainty produced by the constant changing of our tax laws.”220 The
United States Chamber of Commerce summarized such complaints:
The plan would tend to provide substitution of public control for private
management in important fiscal operations of business. It would promote improvident
and unstable dividend policies in many companies. In others it would engender such
uncertainties concerning the sound course to pursue as to subject the management to
grave difficulties with shareholders and creditors. It presents the danger that corporate
214
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management would be subject to serious criticism and even lawsuits if liberal dividend
policies, followed to escape taxes, give rise to charges of dissipation of assets.221
The constant themes running throughout managers’ testimony was that the tax constituted an
unwarranted interference with their ability to run the corporation.
Not only were there more people protesting the undistributed profits tax bill, they were
more direct in complaining about the potential interference with corporate management. Noel
Sargent of the National Association of Manufacturers warned that “[a]ny attempt to substitute the
judgment of commissions or legislators for that of industrial executives as to the percentage of
earnings which can be properly distributed as dividends is economically unsound and fraught
with dangers alike to employers, stockholders, and the public.”222 Herman Lind of the National
Machine-Tool Builders Association echoed such concerns, suggesting that the
management/shareholder and other conflicts engendered by the tax “will deflect the energies of
management from the aggressive production and sale of goods and services which are its main
function, to attempts to cope with a tangled mass of administration problems and
uncertainties.”223
Although managers preferred to cut the undistributed profits tax out of the bill entirely,
they tried to influence the Finance Committee’s consideration of several compromise proposals.
In one prepared with the substantial assistance of the United States Chamber of Commerce, the
undistributed profits tax would become a mere temporary supplement to the corporate income
tax.224 In another, the undistributed profits tax rate would be set at exactly same rate as the
normal tax on dividends, thereby effectively nullifying its effect on dividend policy.225 When the
Senate Finance Committee Chair, Pat Harrison, proposed a modest three percent spread between
the normal (4%) and undistributed profits tax (7%) rates, corporate managers howled,226 but it
was eventually adopted by both the Committee and the full Senate.227
As the bill proceeded to a conference committee to resolve the differences between the
radically different House and Senate versions, corporate managers took their case to shareholders
221
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directly and to the public at large. The president of General Motors, Alfred Sloan, sent a letter to
shareholders with the regular quarterly dividend in which he warned that it “would be little short
of a catastrophe” for the government to interfere with “the employment of accumulated profits by
aggressive and intelligent management.”228 The National Association of Manufacturers issued a
statement declaring that
[b]oth the Senate Finance Committee and House bills accept the principle of taxation of
undistributed profits. Such a proposal is economically unsound, since it repudiates the
policy of industrial reinvestment of earnings upon which expansion and employment
have been based for over 100 years, and because it seeks to substitute government
judgment as to the desirable amount of corporate reserves for that of directors elected by
corporate stockholders.229
Managers hoped that these public relations efforts would pressure Congress to abandon the
undistributed profits tax entirely, but they ultimately proved unsuccessful. The conference
committee successfully pushed through a compromise proposal. Thus, under the Revenue Act of
1936, Congress retained the corporate income tax, subjected dividends to the normal tax, and
imposed an undistributed profits tax at rates ranging from 7% to 27%.230
C.
1.

The campaign to repeal the tax in the Revenue Act of 1938

Aftermath of the 1936 Act

In the immediate aftermath of the passage of the 1936 Act, business opposition to the
undistributed profits tax did not subside. According to Alfred Buehler, national and regional
business associations “continued to direct broadsides of criticism against the measure because of
its alleged complexities, inequalities, and unfortunate effects on corporations.”231 John Morton
Blum recounted that, “[b]ecause that tax tended to return to stockholders the decision about how
to spend or invest their money, it challenged the power of professional managers of large
corporations. These managers, their lawyers, and accountants, in all an able, articulate, and
influential group, were aggressive opponents of the tax.”232 Republicans also helped sustain
opposition by highlighting it during the 1936 election campaign as an example of the
administration’s anti-business stance.233 Alf Landon, the Republican candidate for president,
228
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vowed to eliminate “this vicious method of taxation,” calling the undistributed profits tax “the
most cockeyed piece of tax legislation ever imposed in a modern country.”234
Where managers were forced to increase their dividend distributions as a result of the
1936 Act,235 they used it as another opportunity to publicly assail the undistributed profits tax.
The National Association of Manufacturers spearheaded a campaign to send letters to
shareholders explaining that a desire to avoid the tax, and not the exercise of business judgment,
forced the extra dividends.236 In one example, a prominent oil company declared a special
dividend with an accompanying explanation stating
This special dividend declaration is made in order to reduce the company’s liability for
the new Federal tax on undistributed earnings. Because of the company’s needs for
capital expenditures and debt payments, the directors would prefer to retain in the
business the cash represented by this special dividend. In any event, they would not
ordinarily declare any dividend at this time with respect to earnings for the present
calendar year, as such earnings cannot be known with sufficient exactness in the usual
course of business for some time after year’s end.237
Similar statements accompanied announcements of other changes necessitated by the
undistributed profits tax. For example, the president of a public electric company explained that
the directors voted in favor of a stock split with a reduction in stated par value because the tax
would potentially interfere with plans for capital expenditures,238 and a steel corporation
executive sent a letter to stockholders blaming the undistributed profits tax “for abandoning its
old policy of financing expansion and improvements out of earnings.”239
Some corporate managers complemented their public activism against the tax by
passively resisting its underlying principles. Thus, they continued retaining profits either by
resorting to taxable stock dividends or by agreeing to incur the undistributed profits tax penalty.
The former method, although specifically recommended by Treasury officials during the
hearings,240 was only used by a miniscule percent of the companies subject to the tax because of
legal uncertainties.241 By contrast, a substantial number of managers simply chose to pay the tax
234
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rather than distribute their free cash flow. According to one recent study, a surprisingly high
percentage of corporations paid marginal rates of 22% or more under the tax.242 Thus, managers
in these corporations chose to incur the penalty either because of the deficiencies of shareholder
monitoring or because shareholders implicitly or explicitly consented.
2.

Recession of 1937

In the spring of 1937, a severe economic downturn opened a window of opportunity for
managers to begin a campaign to repeal the undistributed profits tax.243 Critics blamed the tax
either partially or completely for a variety of economic ills,244 including the decline of retail
credit,245 delay and termination of expansion plans,246 lagging employment,247 the onset and
aggravation of stock market volatility,248 and what the president of General Tire and Rubber
Company called, “strikes by capital,” where a lull in business confidence caused both large and
small-time capitalists as well as corporate financiers to keep their money on the sidelines rather
than to invest in business.249 Horace Stoneham, the president of the New York Giants
professional baseball team, even went so far as to blame the undistributed profits tax for his
team’s inability to sign a high profile star like Joe Medwick of the St. Louis Cardinals.250
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Although economists refuted claims that the undistributed profits tax was responsible for
starting the recession,251 corporate managers blamed the tax on creating “a climate of fear and
uncertainty” that both contributed to the recession and made recovery more difficult.252
Prominent business leaders such as the president of Chemical Bank advocated repeal “as a means
of restoring confidence among business men.”253 The American Institute of Accountants issued a
report declaring that in order for business “to face the future confidently” Congress must return to
“fixed principles of taxation” and abandon the failed undistributed profits tax.254
3.

Revenue Act of 1938

The combination of the recession and business' steady campaign against the tax sealed its
fate. The only question in 1938 was whether it would be repealed outright or merely nullified by
reducing its rate so low that it no longer acted as an incentive to distribute profits.
Although Congress initially aimed for the latter option,255 business leaders were not satisfied.
They argued that maintaining even the nominal undistributed profits tax proposed in the
subcommittee report was unacceptable. During hearings before the House Ways and Means
Committee in January of 1938, the United States Chamber of Commerce recommended
“[r]epeal[ing] the thoroughly discredited undistributed profits tax and openly abandon[ing] the
‘principle.’”256 As one railroad executive noted, nothing short of repeal would be sufficient:
“The continuation of this tax, even in the modified form proposed, will continue to hamper
business and destroy the confidence of business management in its ability to look ahead and to
plan and enter into long-time commitments, which constitutes the very essence of recovery. This
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tax should be repealed in its entirety.”257 While corporate managers spoke of the hardships still
imposed under the revised tax, the principal concern appeared to be that retaining the principle
would invite the reintroduction of more meaningful rates in subsequent years.258
The proposal to retain the undistributed profits tax principle received an equally chilly reception
in the hearings before the Senate Finance Committee. The chair of the committee, Senator Pat
Harrison, issued a statement announcing his intent to secure the tax’s repeal: “While the House
retained only the skeleton of the undistributed profits tax . . . the remains will haunt business, and
its complete removal and return to a sufficient flat corporation tax is preferable.”259 This echoed
the sentiments of most business leaders. A representative of the Brooklyn Chamber of
Commerce warned that retaining the principle would make it “an ever-constant threat,”260 while
M.L. Seidman of the New York Board of Trade predicted that “it would remain to haunt business,
not only for what it is, but also for what it may eventually grow into if permitted to remain as a
permanent part of our tax structure.”261 Ellsworth Alvord of the United States Chamber of
Commerce asked “if you impose 3½ percent this year . . . what is there to assure a businessmen
that you will not boost that penalty to 42½ percent as was proposed two years ago?”262
As expected, both the Senate Finance Committee and the Senate heeded business’
complaints and overwhelmingly voted to repeal the undistributed profits tax altogether.263 Only a
last-ditch effort by President Roosevelt led to what one conferee called a “face-saving
compromise” in the Conference Committee.264 The tax was retained at the very low rate of 2.5
percent, but it was scheduled to expire after 1939.265 While Roosevelt hoped to revive it at a later
date, the opposition was still too great. As Robert La Follette, the lone senator who publicly
challenged the repeal, observed the undistributed profits tax “has been the object of one of the
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most widely organized and most successful propaganda campaigns in the history of tax
legislation.”266
III.

A CORPORATE NORMS-BASED EXPLANATION

What accounts for the difference in corporate managers' reactions to the two proposals?
Both appeared to be attempts to restrict behavior in ways that under traditional agency cost theory
analysis managers were likely to oppose. In the case of tax-free reorganizations, the elimination
or restriction of this option would likely decrease a manager's ability to expand his empire and
pursue pet projects. In the case of the undistributed profits tax, the crimp on managerial
discretion over dividend policy and resulting decline in free cash flow would either reduce their
ability to pursue individual projects or force them to be subjected to the scrutiny of the capital
markets.
Some of the difference in reaction may have been the result of the peculiar political and
economic circumstances of the day. During President Roosevelt's first term, when the Revenue
Act of 1934 was introduced and the stock market crash was still a recent memory, business may
have been inclined to be more cooperative in its dealings with the administration.267 By the time
the undistributed profits tax was enacted, however, the political climate had changed. Roosevelt
was perhaps at the height of his power in 1936, but in reaching that point he had sabotaged any
possibility of working together with business.268 The fact that Roosevelt himself had initiated the
undistributed profits tax proposal while the recommendation to abolish the tax-free
reorganization came from a Congressional subcommittee may have heightened the stakes from
266
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the perspective of business leaders. By 1937-38 when the country was in the throes of another
economic downturn, the tide had turned and business leaders had more leverage to use in the
fight against purportedly anti-business measures.269
While the timing factor is not insignificant, it should not be overstated. Business started
to criticize the administration as early as the fall of 1933 and the beginning of 1934.270 A
temporary truce was not declared until after the elections in 1934, which was well after the
reorganization provisions had been amended.271 Moreover, even if business leaders had resisted
opposing the reform because of their pledge to cooperate with the recovery program, it should not
have prevented them from repealing the restrictions once they felt their compact with the
administration had been broken. They did this not only in their battle over the undistributed
profits tax, but also in reversing the abolition of the consolidated return.272
It is also possible that the difference in reaction was in part a reflection of the extent of
the underlying changes in the current tax law. Ever since 1918, managers had been subject to a
fairly strict set of requirements in order to qualify their transactions as tax-free reorganizations.
Moreover, the final changes enacted, while considered substantial by tax practitioners, still left
intact the basic scheme for such transactions. In that sense, the changes might not be described as
"revolutionary." By contrast, there was no undistributed profits tax prior to 1936. President
Roosevelt's proposal to eliminate the corporate income tax and the dividend exemption, while
subjecting undistributed profits to a high levy, would have been a sharp change from the
corporate tax system that had developed during the preceding two decades.
Cutting against the merit of a degree-of-change-based argument is that the undistributed
profits tax also was not altogether new. From the beginning of the income tax in 1913, managers
had been subject to an accumulated earnings tax on earnings retained for the purpose of evading
the surtax rates. While this provision was often not enforced because of the difficulty of proving
intent, its use had been upheld in a 1936 Board of Tax Appeals case,273 which was eventually
affirmed by the Supreme Court in 1938.274 In 1934, Congress adopted a personal holding
company tax for smaller companies that omitted an intent requirement.275 While neither of these
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provisions approached the expansive reach of the undistributed profits tax proposal,276 they did
introduce corporate managers to the concept of a tax limitation on dividend policy.
The full legislative histories of the two provisions further weaken the substantive
argument regarding the extent of the change. From an ex ante perspective, the original proposal
to abolish the reorganization provisions was just as radical as the undistributed profits tax
proposal and yet it was not subject to nearly as much active opposition from business leaders.
Moreover, from an ex poste perspective, business leaders were eager to eliminate all traces of the
undistributed profits tax in 1938, notwithstanding the reduction of the rate to a level that would
make it a non-factor in dividend decisions, while there was no similar attempt to further reduce
the restrictions on tax-free reorganizations after the 1934 Act was passed.
Thus, while a variety of historical and statute-specific factors may have influenced the
different reactions to the two proposals, they do not, either individually or in the aggregate, offer
a complete explanation. There is one potential factor, however, that has not been explored -- the
underlying norms that governed the behavior Congress sought to regulate through the tax laws.
In the case of reorganizations, mergers and acquisitions were historically subject to the oversight
of both shareholders and the state legislature and managers were not accustomed to free rein in
this area. By contrast, dividend policy had always been the exclusive province of directors. This
distinction may have affected managerial attitudes toward the government's attempt to regulate
those areas through the tax laws.
A.

Mergers and Acquisitions

During the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, managers were subject to heavy
constraints on their ability to cause the corporation to engage in a merger or acquisition. First,
such transactions were subject to a shareholder vote, often one that required unanimous or nearunanimous consent. Second, for most fundamental corporate changes such as mergers and
consolidations, managers had to secure the approval of the state, either by statute or via a
provision in their corporate charter. Third, the passage of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act in 1890
introduced federal oversight on mergers and combinations. The combined effect of these
constraints was to undercut any notion of managerial primacy on the issue of mergers and
acquisitions. Thus, it is not surprising that managers responded to the proposed changes with
relatively muted rhetoric.
1.

Shareholder approval

There is a long tradition of shareholder primacy in the context of a fundamental corporate
change. During the mid-to-late nineteenth century, almost all courts required the unanimous
consent of shareholders before a corporation could pursue transactions such as a merger,
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acquisition, or sale of assets.277 Thus, while corporate managers could initiate these and other
similar transactions, shareholders were empowered with the ability to block such transaction
simply by withholding their consent.
The theory underlying the unanimous consent requirement was that a fundamental
corporate change constituted a breach of the shareholder's contract and a violation of his property
rights.278 As to the former justification for unanimity, the argument was that a shareholder
entered into a contract with the corporation when he purchased its stock. This contract, deriving
some of its content from the ultra vires doctrine,279 implied that the corporation had a duty to
continue in operation under roughly the same terms as it had done at the time of purchase. By
merging with another corporation or selling all of its assets, the corporation effectively abandoned
its former charter and thereby breached the contract.280 As to the latter justification for
unanimity, the concern was that the shareholder's property interest in the business' assets would
be taken through a transfer of the assets.
In 1890, the U.S. Supreme Court relied on the unanimous consent requirement to
invalidate a transaction in Mason v. Pewabic Mining Company.281 In the case, the taxpayer's
charter had expired and the company was in the process of winding up its affairs.282 The directors
and a majority of the stockholders sought to transfer the assets to a new corporation, of which
they would be directors and stockholders, in exchange for shares of stock in the new corporation
or their equivalent value.283 The Court upheld the dissenting stockholders' right to block the
transfer. According to the Court, "there is no superior right in two or three men in the old
company, who may hold a preponderance of the stock, to acquire an absolute control of the whole
of it, in the way which they may think to be for the interest of the whole. . . . [W]e know of no
reason or authority why those holding a majority of the stock can place a value upon it at which a
dissenting minority must sell, or do something else which they think is against their interest, more
than a minority can do."284
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This principle of unanimity continued to be the common law rule well into the twentieth
According to the 1927 edition of a contemporary treatise, “[i]n the absence of
century.
statutory authority the consent of every stockholder is absolutely essential to a consolidation; and
dissenting stockholders can not be compelled to give their assent.”286 Even where a charter
provided that in the absence of specific direction the company shall have the greatest rights and
privileges accorded to a corporation of its type, the courts refused to approve a consolidation with
less than unanimous shareholder approval.287
While the unanimous consent requirement could be and was relaxed by state statute in
some jurisdictions by the 1930s,288 directors were still subordinated to the shareholders on the
issue of fundamental corporate change. As William Meade Fletcher explained in the 1919 edition
of his Cyclopedia on the Law of Private Corporations, "[c]onsolidation cannot be effected by the
action of the boards of directors but must be consented to by at least a majority of the
stockholders."289 The same rules were in place for a sale of all of the assets of a corporation,
where, according to one contemporary commentator nearly half of the state statutes had
abandoned the unanimous consent requirement, but all still required at least a majority.290
Sometimes this meant a majority of the stock ownership, so that in practice a few stockholders
could still control,291 although occasionally it simply meant a majority or more of the
stockholders present at a duly called meeting in which at least a quorum was present.292
Typically, the requirement for "majority" approval meant considerably more than that, often
requiring two-thirds or even three-quarters or four-fifths of the shareholders to consent to the
transaction.293 When there were multiple classes of voting stock present, each class was required
to approve the transaction by the minimum percentage.294
285
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Even where the decision to merge was approved by at least the required percentage, the
merger could still be overturned by the courts if it was deemed unfair to the minority. In New
Jersey, for example, the court of chancery enjoined the merger of five public utility companies
into the Public Service Electric and Gas Company despite the fact that Public Service owned
more than two-thirds of the capital stock of the merging companies and could therefore satisfy
New Jersey's minimum approval requirement.295 The minority shareholders complained that the
preferred stock they were to receive in exchange for their common stock was actually less secure
than their previous holdings. The court held that "the merger, in effect, is nothing less than a
forced sale by the majority stockholders to itself at a price fixed by it and payable at its pleasure.
The preferred stock is but the equivalent of a six per cent. promissory note payable in three years
at the option of the buyer. The merger legislation countenances no such perversion of the
contractual obligations of stockholders inter sese. Continued membership, until dissolution is an
inherent property right in corporate existence."296 The court thus effectively limited the majority's
right to engage in a "freeze out" merger.297
2.

Legislative approval

Although corporations could generally sell and acquire large amounts of assets under the
common law,298 there was no implied right to merge or consolidate with another company.299
Corporations needed to secure the consent of the legislature in order to engage in a merger or
consolidation.300 As William Meade Fletcher put it, "[l]egislative authority is just as essential to
a valid consolidation or merger of existing corporations as it is to the creation of a corporation in
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the first instance."301 This could either come from a specific grant of authority in the
corporation's original charter or via a general grant of authority by state statute.302
In many states, the principal problem was that there was no merger or consolidation
statute that blessed such transactions. At the time that the tax-free reorganization provision was
being considered in 1934, only thirty-three states and the Territory of Hawaii had general statutes
authorizing corporations to merge or consolidate.303 The fourteen remaining states, plus Alaska,
the District of Columbia, the Philippine Islands, and Puerto Rico had no special provisions for
conferring such authority.304 Thus, in the absence of a charter provision or special act of the
legislature, corporations in those states where not eligible to participate in such transactions.305
Even where a state merger statute existed, it was often limited in scope. Most of the
early state law merger statutes restricted mergers based on the powers granted to the corporations
under their respective charters. The concern appeared to be that an activity that would be ultra
vires under the charter of one corporation would suddenly become acceptable by virtue of the
more permissive charter of the combined enterprise. Thus, for example, in New Jersey, the right
to merge or consolidate was restricted to corporations organized to undertake “any kind of
business of the same or similar nature,” the nature of the business being determined by the charter
or certificate of incorporation.306 Under this provision, the New Jersey courts denied permission
for the consolidation of the United States Leather Company and the Central Leather Company
because, even though the companies were generally engaged in the same line of business, the
charter of one contained broader powers than the charter of the other.307
During this same period, there were other similar examples of purpose and geographical
restrictions. New York only permitted the consolidation of corporations incorporated "for
kindred purposes." 308 Connecticut limited its statute to parties "carrying on business of the same
or a similar nature."309 Illinois only permitted consolidation of "corporations of the same kind
and engaged in the same general business and carrying on their business in the same vicinity."310
Moreover, while most such purpose restrictions had been removed or weakened by the 1930s,311
many statutes still restricted a corporation's ability to merge or consolidate with a corporation
from another state, either by denying the power to engage in the transaction altogether or by a
301
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requirement that the surviving party be a domestic corporation.312 In some cases, the merger or
consolidation even had to be approved by a state regulatory board or corporation commission to
be effective.313
While sales of large amounts of corporate assets were permitted under the common law,
they were often subject to many of the same statutory restrictions as mergers or consolidations.
According to one contemporary commentator, "[a]lthough merger and consolidation is strictly
statutory and a sale of assets is essentially contractual, as a practical matter in a given case it may
be extremely difficult to decide whether the device employed was merger and consolidation or a
sale of assets inasmuch as today, the latter also usually follows a statutory procedure."314
3.

Federal oversight

In addition to the oversight exercised by state legislatures, fundamental corporate
changes were subject to federal oversight. The earliest and most prominent source of this
oversight was the Sherman Anti-Trust Act. Adopted in 1890, this act held that "every contract,
combination, in the form of a trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce
among the several states or with foreign nations" was illegal.315 Vague language, the failure to
provide for an agency to implement the Act, and the Supreme Court's narrow interpretation of the
law hampered its effectiveness,316 but it provided the basis for later federal challenges of merger
activity during Theodore Roosevelt’s administration.
In 1902, Roosevelt directed his attorney general to revive the then-dormant Sherman Act
by pursuing an antitrust action against the Northern Securities Company.317 Two years later, the
Court ordered the company’s dissolution. Emboldened by his success, which earned him the
“trust-buster” label, Roosevelt set his sights on even bigger targets. Thus, Roosevelt brought
separate federal antitrust actions against the Standard Oil Company and the American Tobacco
Company. After protracted litigation, in 1911 the Supreme Court issued opinions ordering that
both Standard Oil and American Tobacco be broken up into several smaller companies.318 While
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these victories were far from complete, they did mark a departure from “the uncritical approval of
business expansion” that characterized the early-to-mid nineteenth century.319
Perhaps more importantly, the results may have chilled some transactions. According to
one 1913 edition of a practitioner's treatise, "the general result of the federal decisions in the
Tobacco, Standard Oil, and other similar cases has been to leave the situation in perplexing
uncertainty. At the present time it is not possible for counsel to advise what can be safely done in
forming industrial combinations."320 The same treatise noted that "[a]t present few new
combinations are being formed. The Sherman Anti-Trust Law, after many years of more or less
innocuous desuetude, finally became a live law. The business world, which had considered its
provisions negligible, was dismayed to find that it really meant something and that it could be
enforced against the largest and most firmly entrenched combinations."321
Soon after the resolution of the Standard Oil and American Tobacco cases, Congress
enacted the Clayton Antitrust Act in 1914 to further buttress Federal oversight in this area.322 By
outlawing interlocking directorates, Congress sought to prevent indirect combinations of
companies that were in restraint of trade.323 Unlike the Sherman Act, this measure was
accompanied by the creation of an enforcement agency, the Federal Trade Commission, which
served to investigate unfair trade practices and issue cease and desist orders.324
While neither the Sherman Act nor the Clayton Act posed serious obstacles to business
combinations,325 they had established the specter of federal oversight. The threat of antitrust
enforcement action meant that even directors of corporations with willing shareholders and
permissive state merger statutes did not have a free hand to engage in transactions as they saw fit.
B.

Dividend Policies

While managers were accustomed to strict limitations on their abilities to engage in
mergers, acquisitions, and other fundamental corporate changes, it was a different story when it
came to dividend policy. There were some limitations on the source of a dividend payment, but
these related to the source of funds, rather than the decision to issue a dividend. The decision
whether to issue a dividend or retain the profits for other uses was committed to the discretion of
the board of directors by well-established law. Moreover, this legal right to retain earnings was
buttressed by the business custom, which took hold around the turn-of-the-century, of retaining a
significant percentage of earnings each year. Thus, it should not be surprising that corporate
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managers mounted an all-out assault against the undistributed profits tax and its threat to their
continued discretion over dividend policy.
1.

Early history

In the infancy of the corporation, dividends were essentially unregulated.326 This was in
part because during the days of the joint stock trading company, a corporation would distribute
all of its assets at the completion of each voyage.327 There was little need to impose significant
limits on the distribution of profits in these essentially single-purpose enterprises. This era of
unregulated dividends, however, soon came to an end because of two developments in corporate
law and finance. First, the advent of the concept of fixed, or permanent, capital from which a
corporation’s earnings would flow meant that there had to be some method of distinguishing
between that part of the corporation’s assets that was available for distribution as a dividend and
that part of the assets that constituted its capital and would remain within the corporation.
Second, the development of limited liability for corporate stockholders elevated the importance
of both the distinction between capital and income and the distinction between the assets in the
hands of the corporation and the assets in the hands of its stockholders. The former was
important because under a system of limited liability creditors would often decide to extend
credit based upon the value and availability of the fixed or permanent property of the corporation.
If this property were subject to division prior to the liquidation of the corporation, the creditors
would have virtually no protection at all. The latter was important because, unlike the general
partnership where partners remained personally liable for the partnership debts even after a
distribution, the creditors’ only recourse for repayment of the debts was to look to the assets
while held in the corporation. A dividend would permanently remove those assets from the
corporate solution. These two developments led to a spate of statutory and non-statutory
limitations on the distribution of profits in a corporation.
2.

Dividends paid out of "profits"

The first limitation on dividends was the requirement that dividends be paid exclusively
from the profits of the corporation, as distinct from the “capital,” or the money originally
contributed by the stockholders.328 Initially, companies followed such a rule by custom. Thus,
326
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after the British East India Company established a permanent joint stock in 1657, dividends were
henceforth issued “out of profits leaving the capital untouched.”329 Before long, however, the
Crown began to impose such a “profits” limitation through the charters of the corporations it
authorized. The 1694 charter of the Bank of England provided that “no dividend shall at any
time be made by the said governor and company save only out of the interest, profit or produce
arising by or out of the said capital stock or fund, or by such dealing, buying, or selling as is
allowed by the said Act of Parliament.”330 This type of limitation continued during the special
charter era in America, although the provisions tended to be ad hoc in nature.331 In 1825, New
York enacted the first general dividend statute in the country, which limited dividends to “surplus
profits arising from the business of such corporations.”332 This became the model for nineteenth
century general corporation law provisions governing dividends.333 There was still little
agreement as to how to distinguish between profits and capital, but it was well established that
such a distinction itself was important.334
2.

Penalties for dividends paid out of capital

A second rule imposed penalties on the directors and stockholders for any distribution of
dividends out of capital. When Parliament authorized an increase in the capital stock of the Bank
of England in 1697, it provided that if the corporation issued a dividend that reduced its capital
stock without first reducing its outstanding debt, the stockholders “shall be severally liable” to
any creditors of the Bank.335 A similar rule was imported to America, where a commonly cited
Massachusetts statute provided that “[i]f the directors of any such company shall declare and pay
any dividend, when the company is insolvent or any dividend, the payment of which would
render it insolvent, they shall be jointly and severally liable for all the debts of the company” in
an amount not to exceed the amount of the dividend.336 The New York statute was even broader,
imposing liability on the directors if a dividend reduced the capital stock of the company, even if
it did not induce insolvency.337 By the end of the century, New York had gone one step further,
making it a misdemeanor to declare a dividend out of the capital stock of the corporation.338 In
general, these director liability statutes were made necessary by the conferral of limited liability
on corporate stockholders. As one early observer noted, “if limited liability was to survive, a rule
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against impairment of corporate capital by dividends or other repayments to stockholders was
inevitable.”339
3.

Dividends under the sole discretion of the board of directors

A third rule, which followed naturally from the first two, was that a corporation’s
directors had the sole discretion to determine whether to declare a dividend. This was made clear
early on in the development of dividend limitations in this country. Alexander Hamilton drafted
a charter for the Bank of North America that authorized the directors to “make from time to time
such dividends, out of the profits, as they may think proper.”340 A similar provision in the Bank
of United States’ charter permitted as much dividends out of profits “as shall appear to the
directors advisable.”341 As one commentator affirmed, by the early 1890s there was little doubt
as to the board of directors’ power over whether to declare a dividend: “The directors, being the
agents of the corporation, alone have the power to determine the amount and to declare a
dividend from its earnings – a power resting in their honest discretion, uncontrollable by the
courts, when not exercised illegally, wantonly or oppressively.”342
Under this highly developed legal infrastructure, a stockholder had little legal recourse in
the event the directors of a corporation chose not to distribute a dividend. There were some cases
that appeared to support a stockholder’s right to petition for the division of surplus profits,343 but
these cases relied primarily on exceptions, rather than alternatives, to the rule. Henry Ballantine
wrote that "there must be bad faith or a clear abuse of discretion on their part to justify a court of
equity in interfering" in the directors' determination of dividend policy.344 The right to a dividend
339
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was, in effect, not a right at all. As one contemporary commentator described it, “[t]he right of a
stockholder to share in the surplus of profits is in the nature of an inchoate right, until a
distribution or dividend has been actually declared by the proper officers of the corporation.”345
Justice Thomas Cooley, writing on behalf of the Michigan Supreme Court, explained “until the
dividend is declared . . . the dividend is only something that may possibly come into
existence.”346
4.

Business custom

Corporate managers used their legal discretion to justify adherence to a corporate finance
norm favoring retained earnings. While the conventional wisdom during much of the nineteenth
century had been to distribute all or almost all of a corporation's earnings as dividends and raise
expansion capital through the debt or equity markets,347 by World War I the conventional wisdom
was that a corporation should “plow back” a substantial percentage of its earnings to fund
expansion, protect against downturns, maintain regular dividend policies, and provide for
unexpected expenses.348 In his 1917 treatise on business finance, William Lough noted that "[i]t
is generally agreed that regular dividends combined with large -- or at least adequate -- savings
out of annual income should be features of the financial management of most corporations."349 A
few years later, one observer reported that "[t]oday it is taken for granted that no corporation
shall pay out more than a fraction of its earnings."350
The available data suggests that this development in corporate finance theory was
followed by a majority of companies. While dividends hovered around 80 to 90 percent of
earnings prior to the turn-of-the-century, they had dropped to approximately 50 to 60 percent of
earnings during the first few decades of the twentieth century.351 According to one study, the
majority of companies retained as much as fifty-five percent of their earnings during the period
between 1922 and 1930.352
This retained earnings norm was bolstered by a corresponding norm in favor of regular
dividends, rather than dividends that fluctuated with earnings. In the 1926 edition of his
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corporate finance treatise, Arthur Dewing noted that "[t]he regularity of dividend payments helps
the corporation in two very important respects. It creates a loyal group of stockholders who hold
their stock for investment and not for speculation. It also creates a strong credit to be utilized for
borrowing in the open market."353
The demand for regular or level dividends was in part a byproduct of the introduction of
preferred stock. The early American corporation only had one class of stock and each
shareholder had the same right to dividends as any other shareholder.354 Starting around the
middle of the nineteenth century, however, transportation companies, particularly in the railroad
industry, began to offer a preferred level of stock as a method of attracting equity capital.355
These securities had characteristics of both debt and equity. They provided for guaranteed
dividend rates similar to interest payments on debt, but the holder could not foreclose on the
instrument if his dividends fell in arrears.356 Toward the end of the century, the preferred stock
method expanded to industrial securities,357 where the guaranteed dividend rate was attractive in
unregulated industries with little or no financial disclosure. For the individual who formerly
invested exclusively in debt securities, preferred stock was a middle ground between the risk of
common stock and the relative certainty of debt.358
Although a board of directors could refuse to issue any preferred dividend at all, there
was significant pressure to distribute the promised amount. The fact that most early preferred
stocks appeared to have been issued on a cumulative basis only increased this pressure.359 The
cumulative feature meant a board of directors deciding against declaring a dividend in a
particular year first would have to pay the preferred stockholders for all past and current
dividends due before paying any dividend to the common stockholders. While this provision
helped attract capital by making the equity instrument seem more debt-like, it further increased
353
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the pressure to meet the preferred dividend payment.360 Managers could avoid the binding nature
of the cumulative provision by inducing the preferred shareholders to agree to a
recapitalization,361 but in practice they paid dividends whenever possible.362
The advent of preferred stock not only introduced the notion of a guaranteed dividend
rate for preferred stockholders, but also created the climate for a quasi-guaranteed, regular
dividend for all stockholders. Although a corporation could continue to pay the preferred
dividend while choosing to pass on dividends for holders of the common stock, discriminating
between the classes of stock was often difficult. This was especially true when promoters had
promised that the common stockholders would receive a regular dividend. One observer noted
that “to the holders of common stock it seemed unreasonable and unjust that, in such prosperous
times, a discrimination should be made in favor of the preferred stock. The reputation of the
management of many of the industrial combinations was seriously injured by their failure to
redeem their promises of dividends on the common stock."363
As stock ownership spread, the demand for regularity in dividend payments increased.364
Whereas fewer than 4.5 million individuals owned stock in 1900, more than triple that number -almost 14.5 million -- owned shares by 1922.365 The growth in stock ownership not only
increased the size of the stockholding population, it changed the face of the typical stockholder.
For example, by World War I stock ownership had spread to middle income individuals.366 This
new type of stockholder viewed dividends as a one of his or her primary sources of income. One
economist, writing in 1924, noted that over the last twenty-five years, "[t]he tendency toward a
more democratic distribution of beneficiary interests in the corporations of the country has been
attended by an increase in the number of people who are getting a portion of their income from
their accumulated savings."367 Although stockholders may have been worse off in the long term
360
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by the more conservative dividend policies,368 regularity was important both for stockholders
who depended upon the dividends for monthly expenses and for those who saw dividends as a
signal of a stable financial company.
Corporations took advantage of this demand for regularity by publicly announcing their
shifts in dividend policy.369 The United States Rubber Company, for example, had been
characterized by wildly erratic earnings and dividends since its founding in 1892.370 In 1911,
after an eleven-year drought in dividend payments, the company announced that it would
commence paying a four percent regular annual dividend on its common stock.371 As a result of
this move, United States Rubber’s stock rose twelve points in less than two weeks, underscoring
the importance of regularity for common stockholders.372
The problem with regular dividends was that the earnings of all companies fluctuated to
some extent. During down years, a corporation would not be able to pay out the dividend and the
goal of regularity would be defeated. As Dewing observed "[a] regularity of dividend payments
must therefore be superimposed on an irregularity of earnings."373 To achieve this result, experts
advised companies to retain a certain amount of their earnings each year as a cushion. Lough
warned that "dividends must not be allowed to rise, even in the most prosperous periods, above a
conservative estimate of the minimum earnings of the company."374 While corporations did
sometimes deviate from this conservative dividend policy to distribute additional amounts in a
particularly profitable year, they maintained a policy of regularity by referring to such amounts as
an "extra" or "special" dividend paid on top of the regular dividend.375
IV.

CONCLUSION

The influence of legal and non-legal norms of corporate behavior on the fate of corporate
tax initiatives may have significant relevance for modern tax policy. In the New Deal examples
thrifty American investor of part of his livelihood." Joseph P. Kennedy, Big Business, What Now?, THE SATURDAY
EVENING POST, Jan. 16, 1937, at 80.
368
See O.J. Curry, Utilization of Corporate Profits in Prosperity and Depression, 9 MICH. BUS. STUD. 1, 17 (1941);
BENJAMIN GRAHAM & DAVID L. DODD, SECURITY ANALYSIS: PRINCIPLES AND TECHNIQUE 375-76 (2d ed. 1940).
369
In 1907, for example, the American Telephone and Telegraph Company announced an $8 per year regular dividend.
See DEWING, supra note 342, at 763 n. ee.
370
Id. at 548 n. j.
371
Dividend on Rubber Common, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 6, 1911, at 15. In an announcement regarding the move, the
company’s president explained “notwithstanding the fact that for some years past the surplus net earnings have been
considerably in excess of the sum required for dividends upon the preferred stocks, the Directors have felt it for the
best interests of the company to defer payments on the company.” Id. He attributed the current move to a substantial
gain from their automobile tire line. Id.
372
Id.
373
DEWING, supra note 353, at 547.
374
LOUGH, supra note 349, at 444.
375
See, e.g., Dividends, N.Y. TIMES, April 9, 1907, at 13 ("At a meeting of the Board of Directors of the New York
Produce Exchange Bank, held this day, a semi-annual dividend of Three (3%) Per Cent was declared and an extra
dividend of One (1%) Per Cent payable April 15th."). See also DEWING, supra note 353, at 561 (noting that it is called
an "extra" dividend to signal to the shareholders that it is not permanent).

(7/13/2004)

TAX, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, AND NORMS

51

described in this paper, corporate managers fiercely resisted a measure that attempted to impose a
new norm of corporate behavior – a norm of higher dividends and limited managerial discretion
over dividend policy. By contrast, corporate managers only offered minimal resistance to a
measure that merely reinforced an existing norm of corporate behavior – the norm of state,
federal, and shareholder oversight for mergers and acquisitions – and those changes have
essentially endured to the modern day. While there is no evidence whether either tax measure did
have, or could have had, the effect on the underlying corporate behavior that Congress intended
to regulate, the difference in the fate of each measure is a cautionary tale for corporate reformers
seeking to enact governance measures through the tax code. If the New Deal examples are not
atypical -- an important qualifier in determining the modern relevance of any historical study -the implication is that Congress can reinforce existing norms through the Code, but it will have
more difficulty if it seeks to initiate such norms through the tax laws.
Far from being atypical, the New Deal examples studied in this piece have modern
analogies. For instance, the corporate norms-based explanation may help explain the outcome of
recent attempts to use the tax code to regulate corporate governance in the area of executive
compensation. In 1993, Congress enacted Section 162(m) in an attempt to control excessive
executive compensation.376 Under this provision, corporations are subject to a $1 million cap on
the deductibility of compensation provided to any of its top five executives, subject to an
exception for "any remuneration payable solely on account of the attainment of one or more
performance goals."377 In this case, the exception was designed to swallow the rule. As one
Treasury official explained, Section 162(m) "was not intended to be a revenue raising provision,
but a behavior-shaping provision. The exception for performance-based compensation 'is not a
loophole.'"378 The intention was to encourage corporations to switch from guaranteed salary
arrangements to more performance-based executive compensation packages, including those
centered around company stock and stock options in order to better align pay with
performance.379
While Section 162(m) has survived, it has been undermined through managerial
resistance and avoidance. According to one observer, the rule is “completely inoperative” as a
limit on executive compensation.380 It has failed to stem the growth of executive compensation
packages and business leaders and tax lawyers believe that it has actually “encouraged bloated
executive pay” by creating a $1 million minimum wage for executives and a push for large stock
option grants.381 According to one report, “’executive pay actually rose at a 29 percent faster rate
in the first year after the law took effect than in the previous 14 years after the service had
376
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collected comparable information.’ From 1994 to 1995, corporate deductions for executive pay
increased more than 9.1%, compared with an average increase of 7% between 1980 and 1994.”382
Moreover, early on corporate managers found ways to subvert the original goal of aligning pay
with performance by resorting to the derivatives market.383 Many prominent investors and
former government officials have now admitted defeat and are calling for the provision’s
repeal.384
When viewed from the perspective of the underlying corporate norm at stake, this
outcome should have been quite predictable. While early charters sometimes fixed the corporate
managers’ salaries or made them subject to a vote of a majority of the stockholders,385 executive
compensation has long been the exclusive province of the board of directors. As the author of
one treatise observed in 1933, “[s]alaries paid to officers must bear some reasonable relation to
the value of their services. But courts will not review salaries voted by the board unless they are
so clearly excessive as to amount a fraud upon the corporation.”386 Recently, securities laws have
attempted to impose various disclosure requirements for executive compensation,387 but
shareholders still have no say in the compensation process under state laws and they tend to
remain quite passive even when the information is disclosed.388 Thus, managers are likely to
resist attempts to indirectly control compensation through the tax code and shareholders are not
going to view such resistance as in violation of existing norms.
This attempt to override existing corporate norms is what distinguishes tax provisions
such as Section 162(m) from those tax provisions that have been praised for their corporate
governance benefits by modern scholars. David Schizer, for instance, has argued that taxation is
an ally in the corporate governance arena by providing constraints on executives seeking to
reduce the incentive effects of their options to purchase employer stock.389 Through rules
governing exit strategies with respect to options, such as the disincentive to exercise under
Section 83 and the disincentives to hedging resulting from both the constructive sale rules and the
mismatch between capital and ordinary rates in a hedge, the tax system helps to bolster the
incentive effects.390 Schizer concedes, however, that “[a]lthough Congress sometimes
382
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deliberately uses the tax code to pursue corporate governance objectives, the tax constraints on
exercising and hedging options do not fall into this category.”391 Some of the advantage in this
case may be that the rules in question did not appear to constitute a threat, but the distinction runs
deeper.
The corporate benefits in this case may be more than a mere indirect benefit of provisions
adopted on tax policy grounds, but may in fact be the direct benefit of tax provisions that support
existing corporate norms of behavior rather than trying to install new ones. In the case of
hedging, Schizer found that firms either banned the practice directly or raised its costs indirectly
by preventing executives from pledging their option grants.392 While he considered such
constraints to be ineffective or incomplete,393 they suggest that executive hedging of option grants
are disfavored under corporate law and practice. Schizer confirms this by predicting that if the
tax limitations were repealed, shareholders and executives would likely cooperate in erecting
contract and securities law barriers to fill the gap.394 Thus, the use of tax law in this instance was
merely to reinforce this existing norm of corporate behavior rather than to change it altogether.
This appears to help explain why tax may have been an ally of corporate governance measures in
limiting executive hedging while being either ineffective or counterproductive in controlling
executive compensation more generally.
Thus, at least in these examples norms appear to have some relevance in distinguishing
between corporate governance-oriented tax provisions. While more study may be beneficial on
this point, the basic premise is intuitively appealing. Provisions that help reinforce existing
norms may be better received, which will aid in their prospects for long-term success. By
contrast, those provisions designed to initiate new norms or overturn existing ones are much more
likely to face opposition and fail. The implication of the historical evidence seems clear: Tax
can be considered an ally of corporate governance, but not a de facto system of federal corporate
law.
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